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Prisons of the Mind: Social Value and Economic Inefficiency 
in the Criminal Justice Response to Mental Illness
Amanda C. Pustilnik†
Can constructs of social meaning lead to actual criminal confinement?1  Can the 
intangible value ascribed to the maintenance of certain social norms lead to radically inefficient 
choices about resource allocation?  The disproportionate criminal confinement of people with 
severe mental illnesses2 relative to non-mentally ill individuals, adjusting for differences in 
lawbreaking conduct between the two groups, suggests that social meanings related to mental 
illness can create legal and physical walls around this disfavored group.  Responding to problems 
of mental illness principally through the criminal system imposes billions of dollars in costs 
annually on the public,3 above any offsetting benefit in public safety and deterrence, and imposes 
terrible human costs on people who suffer from these illnesses.4
†
  Associate, Covington & Burling; Law clerk, Judge José A. Cabranes; J.D. Yale.  I am grateful to Dan M. Kahan, 
Reva B. Siegel, and Kate Stith of the Yale Law School, Dan Hunter of the University of Pennsylvania, and Allan 
Brandt of Harvard University, Chair, Department of the History of Science, for their insightful comments and 
guidance, and for research support provided by the Yale Law School.
1 For a working definition of “social meaning,” see Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 
661, 681 (1998) (defining “‘social meaning’” as “what that [an] act, omission, or status means to a community of 
interpreters”).
2
  See note 23, infra, setting forth the definition of mental illness for purposes of this Article.
3 See Section II.B.1, infra, estimating that the annual incarceration costs alone of nonviolent and nonoffending 
adults and children are approximately $5.95 billion dollars.  This estimate does not include other direct costs of 
involvement in the criminal justice system.
4
  These costs have been noted by a plethora of federal and state task forces and committees.  See COMMITTEE ON 
GOV’T REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INCARCERATION OF YOUTH WHO ARE WAITING FOR 
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES (2004) (hereinafter “HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
INCARCERATION OF YOUTH”); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: PRISON AND JAIL 
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2003 (May 2004) (hereinafter, “BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2003 REPORT”) (reporting 
extensively also on mentally ill individuals in prisons and jails); Exec. Order No. 13263, 3 C.F.R. 233 (2003), 
reprinted in 67 Fed. Reg. 22337 (May 3, 2002) (Order of President George W. Bush, establishing the President’s 
New Freedom Commission on Mental Health); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL 
HEALTH CONSENSUS PROJECT (2002); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: 
MENTAL HEALTH AND TREATMENT OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS (1999) (hereinafter, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
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Yet, the criminal confinement regime may create intangible social value by reinforcing 
norms related to personal responsibility, based on the current and historical social meaning of 
mental illness.  Social meaning is an essential term in the economic analysis of law, a central 
insight of the New Chicago School of law and economics.5  Reform efforts aimed at replacing 
the current punitive paradigm with a medical or therapeutic model founder because they fail to 
account for the social meanings that maintain the punitive paradigm and for the social value it 
creates.  Understanding the social meanings of mental illness and how they intersect with the 
norm-enforcing role of the criminal law can lead to normatively literate reform proposals, 
liberating tremendous economic and human value.
It is beyond cavil that the criminal justice system functions as the United States’ default 
asylum system.  For every one person treated for a psychiatric illness in a hospital, about five 
people with such conditions are treated, or confined without treatment, in penal facilities.  Many 
people with mental illnesses confined in prisons and jails have committed no offense at all or 
merely a public order infraction:  Statistics show that between 30 and 40 percent of mentally ill 
individuals in the jails of certain states had no criminal charges pending against them, while jails 
report frequently holding people with mental illnesses simply because there is no other place to 
put them.  Criminal confinement principally or exclusively because of mental illness affects U.S. 
children as well.
The confinement of adults and children with mental illnesses in penal facilities comes at 
an extraordinarily high cost to the U.S. economy.  The direct costs include the costs of 
involvement in the criminal justice system from arrest through incarceration and release, while 
STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES”); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES, MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1999).  The findings of each of the 
works cited here is discussed infra.
5 Although this term was coined by Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998), 
work in this area has been advanced by many scholars.  
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the indirect costs include lost productivity resulting from untreated or undertreated mental illness 
and from incarceration, as well as the lost productivity of the family members or other intimates 
who provide unpaid care for a person with a mental illness.  Economists and legal scholars have 
not attempted to calculate the total direct and indirect cost to the economy of a public order 
response to mental illness.  This Article attempts to estimate from existing data sources the direct 
cost of the public order response.  It also separates out the costs attributable to the use of the 
criminal system for nonviolent and nonoffending people with mental illnesses from those 
attributable to violent offenders.
Yet, to say something is costly says nothing about its worth.  Even a massive expenditure 
can be valuable if the benefits are similarly great.  In classical economic terms, incarceration 
expenditures can be considered net positive, and rational, if the value they produce in the form of 
deterrence and public safety exceeds the costs.  Yet, a substantial portion of the costs incurred as 
a result of the public order response to people with mental illnesses produces no deterrence or 
public safety benefits.  General deterrence (the notion that potential lawbreakers are dissuaded 
from their intended crime when they see others have been locked up for the same thing) and 
specific deterrence (the prevention of a particular person committing his or her intended crime) 
certainly cannot be promoted by incarcerating people who have not committed a crime.  
Similarly, public safety is not advanced by confining people who are nonoffending or whose 
offenses of conviction are nonviolent.  Even as to violent mentally ill lawbreakers, public safety 
may be better served by detention in secure hospitals, as many prison systems transfer their 
violent mentally ill inmates to hospitals in any event.6  The lack of value in the criminal response 
to mental illness is further thrown into relief by various states’ pilot programs offering less 
6
  See note 59, infra, and accompanying text.
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expensive, more effective non-criminal alternatives.  Yet, these programs are perpetually starved 
of funding.
This presents a stark conundrum:  Why do governmental units choose to spend billions of 
dollars a year to concentrate people with serious illnesses in a system designed to punish 
intentional lawbreaking, when doing so matches neither the putative purposes of that system nor 
most effectively addresses the issues posed by that population?  This set of contradictions is all 
the more puzzling for the extent to which it is generally not remarked upon or challenged.  For if 
there is serious discussion in the academy at all about the truly vast interrelationship of mental 
illness and the criminal justice system, it centers on the interesting but empirically trivial insanity 
defense,7 which is supposed to exclude people with mental illnesses from criminal punishment 
under certain circumstances, not on the paradoxes of why the criminal system is in fact the 
system of choice for dealing with people with these illnesses.8
This Article suggests that the tremendous economic and human costs of the public order 
response to mental illness not only are unquestioned by scholars but actively embraced 
lawmakers and voters because of the prevailing social meaning of mental illness.  The New 
Chicago School of law and economics posits that social meaning (which is what an “act, 
7
  “Rivers of ink, mountains of printer's lead, forests of paper have been expended on [debating the insanity 
defense]” over the last century.  Norval Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 S.CAL. L. REV. 514, 
516 (1968).  A small sample of key works on the insanity defense includes: HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEANING 
OF CRIMINAL INSANITY (1972); ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1967); NORVAL 
MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982); MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE 
RELATIONSHIP (1984); Joseph Goldstein & Jay Katz, Abolish the “Insanity Defense”— Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 
(1963).
8
  The extent of the involvement of people with mental illnesses in the criminal justice system has been written on by 
few legal academics, but most extensively by Michael Perlin; however, Perlin’s focus remains on the insanity 
defense.  See, e.g., Michael Perlin, ‘The Borderline Which Separated You From Me’: The Insanity Defense, the 
Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 1375 (1997); 
Psychodynamics and the Insanity Defense: ‘Ordinary Common Sense’ and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 Nebraska L. 
Rev. 3 (1990).  A literature review reveals neither any institutional analysis of the public order response to problems 
of mental health nor any law and economics analysis of this institutional preference.
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omission, or status means to a community of interpreters”9) creates social value, and that social 
value is an essential term in the economic analysis of law.  This Article contends that the social 
meanings of mental illness at play in U.S. culture are the “moral/punitive” model, which is 
dominant, and the “medical/therapeutic,” which is subordinate.  
Under the moral/punitive model, mental illness is conceived of as a failure of 
responsibility, not as a set of medical conditions that require and respond to treatment.  Social 
value is created through a criminal justice response to mental illness because, under current ways 
of thinking about mental illness, the punishment of people with mental illnesses is believed to 
reinforce the core norm of individual responsibility.  Punishment of people with mental illnesses 
dovetails with our beliefs about the appropriate role of the criminal system in punishing culpable 
failures of responsibility and of prison as the place for people who violate not only the law but 
core social norms.
Support for this claim is abundant:  The notion that mental illness should not be treated 
but policed as a failure of responsibility, and that that reinforces the norm of individual 
responsibility, finds expression in legal scholarship, among mock and actual juries, in legislation 
and in the statements of lawmakers.  The unacceptability of hospital-based confinement as a 
potential “alternative sanction” also attests to the primacy of the moral/punitive model over the 
medical/therapeutic.  Further, the contrast between the criminal disposition of people with mental 
illnesses and the excuse of “temporary insanity” highlights the role that the specific social 
meaning of mental illness plays in relation to the norm of individual responsibility.  This defense 
applies only to non-mentally ill actors who break the law as a result of certain “provocative” 
circumstances (originally, catching a spouse in adultery, although the circumstances deemed 
sufficiently provocative are historically and culturally contingent).  This shows that the law 
9 Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 681 (1998).
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excuses lapses that are construed as virtuous but not those that are seen as culpable, or simply 
alien.
Like mental illness, the institution of prison also has a particular social meaning.  An 
extensive body of scholarship on the history of the prison suggests that prison not only confines 
but signifies society’s disgust toward those who transgress against valued norms, including 
against the norm of individual responsibility.  This meaning of the prison in addition to 
confinement (for secure hospitals can also confine) points to utility created by the incarceration 
even of nonviolent and nonoffending people with mental illnesses—so long as mental illness is 
conceived of under a moral/punitive paradigm.  But if mental illness were conceived of under a 
medical/therapeutic model, the confluence between the meanings of mental illness and of prison 
would disappear.  This would liberate tremendous economic and human value and require the 
location of people with mental illnesses in a different, treatment-based system.  
My argument proceeds in four parts.  Part I introduces New Chicago School scholarship 
and the rise of the importance of social meaning in the economic analysis of law.  It then posits 
the existence of some positive social value created by the public order response to mental illness 
that accounts for the resilience of that regime.  
Part II presents the use of corrections facilities as confinement centers for people with 
mental illnesses, the tremendous associated costs, and the absence of offsetting gains in 
deterrence or public safety.  Section II.A presents statistics from the state and federal prison 
systems, including jails and juvenile corrections facilities, to show that the criminal justice 
system in fact serves as the default system for hundreds of thousands of adults and children with 
mental illnesses.  Section II.B estimates the costs associated with using the criminal system 
specifically to confine nonviolent and nonoffending people with mental illnesses and evaluates 
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the extent to which there may be offsetting deterrence or public safety gains.  It concludes that, 
in classical economic terms, the use of the criminal system is irrational because the massive costs 
to confine nonviolent and nonoffending adults and children are not offset by the traditional 
benefits; further, it presents some evidence that public health alternatives are cost-effective but 
disfavored.
Part III supports  the claim that the dominant model of mental illness is the moral/punitive 
one and for the related claim that, under a moral/punitive paradigm, social utility is created 
through the instrumental punishment of people with such illnesses.  Of course, mental illness has 
a complex social existence and this Article does not purport to discern all of its meanings.  Yet, 
there is substantial support in contemporary and historical legal, academic, and popular sources 
for the claim that the moral/punitive and medical/therapeutic conceptions of mental illness are 
the major social meanings of mental illness, and that the dominance of the moral/punitive model 
is linked to the maintenance of norms of individual responsibility.  Section III.A.1 looks at 
responsibility rhetoric among scholars, lawmakers and community members.  Section III.A.2 
considers the counterpoint between excuses for people with actual mental illnesses and the 
“temporary insanity” excuse for non-mentally ill people who break the law in ways consistent 
with prevailing norms.  Section III.B turns to the literature on alternative sanctions to examine 
the failure of hospital-based confinement as an alternative to prison for people with mental 
illnesses. 
Part IV examines the meaning of the institution of the prison in relation to the mentally 
ill.  Tracing the historical interrelationship of the confinement of the “mad” and the development 
of the prison, it shows that the punitive confinement of people with mental illnesses has occurred 
throughout Western history as a method of enforcing not only actual order but of signaling 
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commitments to social order.  The use of the mentally ill as the ultimate symbolic subjects of 
penal correction extends even to the linguistic:  In German, a term for people with mental 
illnesses in use through the mid-20th century was “unzucht”—those who are out of “order”—
while the contemporaneous term for prison was “zuchthaus”—the house of order, or that restores 
order.  Unsurprisingly, long before Western society adopted prison as the punishment for all 
sorts of legal transgressions, the original occupants in all Western countries of “houses of 
correction” were the mentally ill.
The Article closes with prescriptions for future directions.  If we believe that social 
institutions match and reinforce social meanings, then it is the intersection of the cultural 
perception of the mentally ill as culpably deviating from valued norms, and of the criminal 
system as appropriate to reinforcing norms of responsibility and of order that leads to the 
localization of the mentally ill in the criminal system.  As Lawrence Lessig describes in his work 
on “meaning architects,” changes in systems flow from changes in meanings.10
I. Social Meaning the Economic Analysis of the Law.
Following the work of “New Chicago School” theorists on the relationship between 
social meaning and the economic analysis of the law, this Article will argue that, because the 
dominant social meanings of mental illness arise under a punitive paradigm, instead of a 
therapeutic paradigm, reform efforts aimed at substituting treatment for incarceration will fail.  
Liberating the huge economic value that could result from moving away from the punitive model 
toward a treatment-based model will depend on a shift in the social meanings associated with 
these diseases.
10 Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 43-45 (1995) (introducing concept 
of “meaning managers” or “meaning architects”).
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Social meaning is an essential term in the economic analysis of law — a central insight of 
the so-called “New Chicago School” of law and economics.11  Elucidating the relationship 
between classical economic analysis of law and social meaning, scholars proceeding in this 
school posit that laws and policies that are rational under classical economic theory often may 
fail because they do not account for the social meanings of the practices that they attempt to 
influence.  Laws that fail to account properly for the social costs and incentives may influence 
members of the community to defy the legal regime, while those that are consonant with the 
relevant social meanings at issue may be more likely to achieve compliance.  
The “social meaning turn” in legal scholarship aims to expand economic analysis to 
account for real, yet often unaccounted for, costs that community members incur and benefits 
they derive from their actions.12  Rather than rejecting economic analysis, or arguing that much 
human behavior is not susceptible to economic analysis because it is part of the unquantifiable 
world of the emotional or social, it investigates the social meaning of the practice at issue, and 
the associated social costs and benefits of deviating from the norms related to that practice.13
11 Lessig, The New Chicago School, supra note 1, at 661-63, 673 (1998) (defining and discussing the “new” 
Chicago school).  The influence of norm theorists has spread to almost every area of legal studies.  See, e.g., id. at 
673 & n.39; Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 373-89 (1997); 
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Tracey L. 
Meares, It’s a Question of Connections, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 579 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive 
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2032 (1996); Symposium, Law, Economics, and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1643 (1996) (including work by Eric Posner, Lisa Bernstein, David Chamy, Jason Scott Johnston, Edward B. 
Rock, Walter Kamiat, Richard H. McAdams, Wendy J. Gordon, and Richard Delgado).
12 Kahan, supra note 11, at 394-95; Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New 
Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 973, 978-79 (2000) (describing, and offering 
criticisms of, efforts to incorporate normative reasoning about the law, and behavioral economics, into classic 
economic analysis of the law).
13 Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 610 (1998) 
(critique of economic analyses of law that fail to incorporate social costs is “internal to economic analysis”).
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Those social costs and benefits then are built into a more robust account of how a rational 
individual, operating within a specific social context, is likely to act.14
Deviation from a norm imposes a cost as a result of the meanings that other community 
members ascribe to deviation and the penalty (however indirect) assessed therefor.15  As Lessig 
explains, the cost “of deviating from a social norm is . . . a price, associated with a given action . 
. . .  [O]ne only understands that price by interpreting the action consistent with a norm, or the 
action deviating from this norm, in its context.”16  To determine the costs of norm deviation, or 
to understand what levers may be used to change a norm, its social meaning thus must be 
understood.  Departing from valued social norms may cause an actor to incur substantial social 
costs—thus, where the penalty for breaking (or incentive for conforming to) a law does not 
outweigh the social benefits or costs of behaving consistently with extant norms, the actor who is 
maximizing his or her long-term utility within a specific social context should choose to break 
the law.17  Conversely, an incentive or penalty scheme that harnesses the social meanings at issue 
in the practice that is its target are more likely to gain compliance, and may alter the social 
meaning of the practice itself.18
The insights developed in this body of scholarship point to an explanation for the 
persistence of the apparently inefficient regime of incarcerating non-offending and nonviolent 
people with mental illnesses:  That a form of social value is created through the public order 
response to people with mental illnesses.  Specifically, the public order response to issues 
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Lessig, The New Chicago School, supra note 1, at 680-81.
17
  Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2024-25.
18 Id. (exploring “how legal ‘statements’ might be designed to change social norms”).
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presented by people with mental illnesses, rather than a public health response, may relate to 
social meanings of mental illness that construct mental illness as a culpable failure of 
responsibility.  
Because the criminal system reinforces personal and social responsibility, and punishes 
deviance, social meanings that construct the mentally ill as culpably irresponsible could create 
social value by reinforcing the responsibility norm, at relatively low social cost, against a 
disfavored outgroup.  Although otherwise inefficient on its face, the criminal system thus 
becomes the “expressively” logical location for people with mental illnesses, once relevant social 
meanings of mental illness are taken into account.  The path toward substituting a public order 
response for a public health response then becomes clear:  Initiatives to relocate the treatment of 
people with mental illnesses from the criminal system to the health care system, and to refocus 
the social response from the punitive to the therapeutic, only will succeed if they also ambiguate 
or change the predominant social meaning of mental illness from a failure of morality or 
responsibility to a medicalized conception.  
Any initiative to substitute treatment for punishment that does not first change or 
ambiguate the social meanings of mental illness will affront the valued social meanings of 
personal responsibility that are policed by the criminal system.19  As Kahan has argued, legal 
regimes and policies that are economically rational but that run counter to a dominant social 
meaning about the practice at issue will be “politically stillborn” because the narrowly efficient 
alternative has failed to account for the social meaning, or the “work,” that the entrenched 
19 Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is Just? Coercive Versus 
Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1863 (2000) (arguing that “[c]riminal law’s influence comes from 
its operation as a societal mechanism through which the force of social norms is realized and by which the force of 
internal moral principles is strengthened.”).
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regime performs in maintaining certain social meanings.20  In fact, this has been the case:  There 
is a long history of well-intentioned reform efforts aimed at changing the response to people with 
mental illnesses from punitive to therapeutic that have foundered on social meaning.21
Conversely, legislative efforts that support the incarceration of people with mental illnesses, but 
in fact offer little or no gains in public safety, nevertheless win substantial support.22
II. Uses of Corrections Facilities as Confinement Centers for People with Mental Illnesses 
and Associated Costs.
“It is deplorable and outrageous that . . . prisons appear to have become a 
repository for a great number of mentally ill citizens.  Persons who, with 
psychiatric care, could fit well into society, are instead locked away, to become 
wards of the state’s penal system.  Then, in a tragically ironic twist, they may be 
confined in conditions that nurture, rather than abate, their psychoses.”
— Judge William Wayne Justice, Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855 
(S.D. Texas, 1999).
A. Incarceration and “Criminalization” of People With Mental Illnesses.
Nationwide, there are far more severely mentally ill individuals confined in prisons and 
jails than treated in all mental health facilities collectively.  Annually, over three hundred 
thousand adults and children with mental illnesses23—many of whom have committed only a 
20 Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, supra note 13, at 617 (describing the repeated 
failures of movements to substitute alternative sanctions for incarceration due to the failure of alternative sanctions 
to communicate the unequivocal condemnation of law-breaking signaled by incarceration).
21
  Much scholarship has been performed on the cultural history of mental illness and of different efforts aimed at 
reforming the treatment of people with such diseases in Europe and the United States.  This Article will not 
recapitulate this extensive history but draws on it illustratively to demonstrate the failures therapeutically-motivated 
reform efforts.  For two excellent overviews, see ROY PORTER, MADMEN: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MADMEN, MAD 
DOCTORS, AND LUNATICS (2004); THE CONFINEMENT OF THE INSANE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Roy Porter & 
David Wright eds.) (2003).
22 See infra, notes 116-123 and accompanying text (discussing state and federal limitation or elimination of the 
insanity defense); notes 134-138, and accompanying text (discussing New York criminal involuntary commitment 
statute).
23
  The terms “mental illness” or “mental illnesses” cover a diverse collection of diseases that range in severity and 
vary in their causes, symptoms, and treatments.  This Article focuses exclusively on severe mental illnesses such as 
schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.  These diseases are considered “severe” because, if untreated, they substantially 
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public order infraction or no offense at all—are confined in state and federal prisons, jails, and 
juvenile corrections facilities.24 A mere sixty thousand people with such conditions are treated 
annually in medical facilities.25  Thus, for every one person treated in a hospital, about five 
people are treated, or merely confined, in penal facilities.26
Prisons have become the largest mental health facilities in the United States.  For
example, the Los Angeles County Jail holds up to 3,300 people with mental illnesses per day, 
more than any state hospital or mental health facility in the United States.27  Similarly, New 
York’s Rikers Island jail complex holds about 3,000 mentally ill inmates each day, making it 
impair daily life functioning (i.e., basic self-care) and most major life activities (e.g., the ability to hold a job).  
Sufferers require ongoing psychiatric treatment and supportive services in order to function in the community.  This 
definition of mental illness is consistent with those used by the studies on which this Article relies for its statistics, 
ensuring, to the greatest extent possible, “apples to apples” comparison across sources.  See, e.g., COUNCIL OF STATE 
GOVERNMENTS, supra note 4, at 11 (referencing U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, MENTAL 
HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 4-5, 46 (1999)); T. Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications of 
Incarceration for Persons with Severe Mental Disorders: Searching for Rational Health Policy,  24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
283, n.20 (1997); E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., CRIMINALIZING THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL: THE ABUSE OF JAILS 
AS MENTAL HOSPITALS 15 (1992); CORRECTIONAL ASSOC. OF N.Y. AND THE URBAN JUSTICE CENTER, PRISONS AND 
JAILS—HOSPITALS OF LAST RESORT: THE NEED FOR DIVERSION AND DISCHARGE PLANNING FOR INCARCERATED 
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN NEW YORK at 6 & n.3. (1999) (hereinafter “CORRECTIONAL ASSOC. OF N.Y.”).  
These disorders qualify as the “major psychoses” under the DSM-IV, the standard nomenclature of mental illness 
used by health practitioners published by the American Psychiatric Association. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC 
ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994).
24 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES, supra note 4, at 3 (reporting 
284,000 incarcerated people with mental illnesses; further reporting 548,000 on probation).  Figures for 2003 can be 
extrapolated from the 2003 Bureau of Justice Statistics census of prisons and jails.  The Bureau of Justice Statistics 
reports that approximately sixteen percent of all people incarcerated in state prisons (16.2%) and jails (16.3%), and 
approximately seven percent (7.4%) of inmates in federal prisons, have a mental illness as defined in this Article.  
Id. at 1.  For 2003, the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that 1,380,776 people were confined in state prisons and 
local jails, and 691,301 people were confined in federal prisons.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2003 REPORT,
supra note 4, at 2, Tab 1 (May 2004).  Applying the percentages in the Bureau’s report on the prevalence of mental 
illness in prisons and jails, supra, to the totals reported on the 2003 mid-year report, in 2003 there were 
approximately 197,883 people with mental illnesses in state prison, 112,682 in jails, and 11,786 in federal prisons, 
or a total of 322,352.
25
  Michael Winerip, Bedlam on the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1999, at Sec. 6, Page 42, (reporting 61,700 people 
with mental illnesses treated annually in in-patient mental health facilities).
26 Id.
27 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 4, at 6 (citing Treatment Not Jail: A Plan to Re-build Community 
Mental Health, SACRAMENTO BEE, B6 (Mar. 17, 1999)).
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“the state’s largest psychiatric facility.”28  The 2000 Census of state and federal prisons reports 
that the “primary . . . or secondary function” of over 150 prisons nationwide is “mental health 
confinement.”29
The extraordinary proportion of people with mental illnesses confined in criminal 
facilities versus treated in medical facilities does not stem from their higher rate of criminality.  
Federal and state statistics show that people with mental illnesses do not engage in more 
unlawful conduct than people who do not have such illnesses.30  Rather, features of community 
and law enforcement responses to people with mental illnesses and the absence of a viable public 
health alternatives, cause them to be “significantly overrepresented in the criminal justice 
system.”31  Government studies find that “[m]ost of these individuals have committed only minor 
infractions, more often the manifestation of their illness than the result of criminal intent,”32
nuisance offenses such as disturbing the peace, intoxication, and fare-beating.33
28
  Winerip, Bedlam, supra note 25.
29 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT IN 
STATE PRISONS 4 (2000).  It also is worth noting that although incarceration may exacerbate the illnesses of prison 
inmates, it is not causing the prevalence of mental illnesses found in them.  Most mentally ill individuals in the 
prison system have received a diagnosis of mental illness prior to admission to criminal detention.  CORRECTIONAL 
ASSOC. OF N.Y., supra note 23, at 13.  A 1997 HHC Office of Correctional Health Services study found that 68% of 
inmates had had contact with the mental health system prior to incarceration. Id. at 13, n.61.
30 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES, supra note 4, at 9 (presenting 
statistics for federal and state systems).
31 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH CONSENSUS PROJECT: PROJECT 
OVERVIEW  2 (2002) (hereinafter, COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, PROJECT OVERVIEW). 
 
32
  National Association of Counties, Fact Sheet: Diverting the Mentally Ill From Jail (Feb. 2004) (nationwide study 
of counties, referring to the 160,000 people with mental illnesses held in county prisons and jails).  See also BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES, supra note 4, at 9 (finding that 
approximately half of mentally ill inmates in state prisons had been convicted of nonviolent offenses).
33 CORRECTIONAL ASSOC. OF N.Y., supra note 23, at 7 & n.13.  See also Patricia G. Bames, Safer Streets at What 
Cost?, 84 A.B.A. J. 25 (1998) (reporting results from Texas that about 63% of repeat public order, or “quality of 
life,” offenders are homeless), quoting Broken Windows & Broken Lives: Addressing Public Order Offending in 
Austin (Center for Criminology and Criminal Justice Research at the University of Texas at Austin).
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In fact, many jailed adults with mental illnesses have not been charged with any unlawful 
conduct.  Rather, jails frequently hold people with mental illnesses because there is no other 
place to accommodate them.34 In a survey of jails nationwide, thirty percent reported 
incarcerating mentally ill people with no charges against them.35  Although under constitutional 
habeas corpus protections it is unlawful for the state to criminally detain an individual without 
charge, several states have enacted legislation under their police power specifically to permit the 
jailing of mentally ill individuals without charges.36  Officials in other states engage in the same 
practice absent specific authorizing legislation.37  In South Carolina, according to one study, over 
forty percent of mentally ill men and women incarcerated in jails had no criminal charges 
pending against them.38  In Louisiana, the same finding has been made as to nearly thirty percent 
of the state’s severely mentally ill jail inmates.39
These statistics may understate the number of people incarcerated because of mental 
illness.40  Law enforcement officers across the country have reported that they “invent” charges 
34
  Stone, supra note 23, at 291; TORREY ET AL., supra note 23, at 43.
35 TORREY ET AL., supra note 23, at 44 (citing study by the National Association for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) and
the Public Citizen’s Health Research Group) (29 percent, or 403, of the jails reported this practice).
36 See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-10-105(1.1) (West 1994);  Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1020(3) (1994); Tex. Health & 
Safety Code Ann. § 573.001(e) (West 1992); Va. Code Ann. § 37.1-73 (Michie 1994).
37 TORREY ET AL., supra note 23, at 44.  States with the highest percentage of jails reporting that they confine people 
with mental illnesses without charges include South Carolina (41% of jails reporting holding uncharged people with 
mental illnesses), Louisiana (28%), and Washington (25%).  Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.  The figure for Louisiana is 28%.  Id.
40
  Linda A. Teplin, Policing the Mentally Ill: Styles, Strategies, and Implications, in JAIL DIVERSION FOR THE 
MENTALLY ILL 10, 12-14 (Henry J. Steadman ed., 1990) (suggesting that many severely mentally ill are arrested 
because the police view a mental health referral as unavailable).  For a discussion of “mercy arrests,” see also 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 21, n.35 (2003).
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against mentally ill individuals in order to bring them into jails.41  A West Virginia jail official, 
for example, reported that he believed a local psychiatric hospital releases its patients “too 
easily.”42  To correct the hospital’s “mistakes,” he reported inventing charges on which to detain 
mentally ill individuals.43
Through a combination of increased likelihood of arrest, re-arrest, and detention without 
charge or on spurious charges, people with mental illnesses are significantly more likely than 
other people to spend time in criminal confinement without having committed more lawbreaking 
acts.44 According to Senate testimony, “up to 40 percent of adults who suffer from a serious 
mental illness will come into contact with the . . . criminal justice system at some point in their 
lives,” often “unnecessarily.”45
Criminal confinement because of mental illness affects U.S. children as well.  In July 
2004, the House Committee on Government Reform issued a study46 that found, across the 
41
  Stone, supra note 23, at 292-94.  Stone states that “many persons with mental disorders are charged with 
misdemeanors or other minor offenses just to get them off the streets and as a means of obtaining mental health 
treatment that is not available in a civil, as opposed to a criminal, setting.”  Id. at 292-93.  For example, a Florida jail 
director reported “routinely” holding uncharged mentally ill individuals for “up to six weeks” in paper gowns 
because of the lack of available hospital beds.  TORREY ET AL., supra note 23, at 45; see also Stone, supra, at 294.  
Similarly, an Arizona sheriff reported fabricating charges repeatedly to jail a severely mentally ill homeless woman.  
TORREY, supra, at 47.
42 TORREY ET AL., supra note 23, at 47.
43 Id. (quoting sheriff stating, ““[I]f the mental institutions will not hold them, I will.”).
44
  Women with a serious mental illness are six times more likely to be incarcerated than women without such 
diseases, while men with such illnesses are four times more likely to be incarcerated than men without them.  
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, PROJECT OVERVIEW, supra note 31, at 2 (citing Judith F. Cox, et al., A Five-
Year Population Study of Persons Involved in the Mental Health and Local Correctional Systems, 28 J. 
BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVS. & RESEARCH 177 (2001)) (figures based on study of New York state prison system).
45
  Sen. Patrick Leahy, Statement Before Executive Business Meeting (Oct. 23, 2003) (in support of S. 1194, the 
Mentally Ill Offender Treatment And Crime Reduction Act Of 2003).
46 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INCARCERATION OF YOUTH, supra note 4.  The Special Investigations Division of 
the House Committee surveyed every juvenile detention facility in the United States.  Id. at i. (stating that study is 
the first to survey the criminal detention of mentally ill juveniles nationwide).  Detention facility administrators in 
49 states responded to the survey, with seventy-five percent of all facilities responding.  Id.  (New Hampshire failed 
to respond.  Id. at 4-5).  The Committee’s report defines juvenile detention facilities as “secure correctional 
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United States, “the inappropriate incarceration of . . . youth with serious mental disorders,” some 
as young as seven years old,47 who have been “placed in detention without any criminal charges 
pending against them.”48 In the period covered by the survey, about “11% of all youth 
incarcerated at these facilities” were non-offenders;49 corrections facilities in 33 states 
“report[ed] holding youth with mental disorders without any charges against them” because 
“[n]o other place would accept the child[ren].”50
The prevalence of people with mental illnesses in criminal confinement, and the role that 
mental illness itself plays in causing adults and children to become criminally confined, has led 
reform-minded law makers to conclude that “[w]e have basically made mental illness a crime in 
this country.”51
facilities” but “does not refer to the juvenile prison system, where youth who are convicted of crimes . . . serve their 
sentences.”  Id. at 3.
47 Id. at i, 6 (2004). Additionally, 117 facilities reported incarcerating children aged 10 and younger based on 
mental illness alone.  Id. at 6.
48 See Testimony of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Juvenile Detention Centers: Are They Warehousing Children with 
Mental Illness?, Governmental Affairs Committee, U.S. Senate (July 7, 2004).  The House of Representatives also 
found the confinement of youth with psychiatric diagnoses who had committed offenses ranging in severity.  HOUSE 
OF REPRESENTATIVES, INCARCERATION OF YOUTH, supra note 4, at i.  The mental illnesses suffered by these 
children principally include depression, schizophrenia, eating disorders, and post-traumatic stress disorder.  Id. at 9.  
This Article excludes from discussion the confinement of children with non-psychiatric disabilities such as 
retardation.
49 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INCARCERATION OF YOUTH, supra note 4, at ii, 8.  Relatedly, many families are 
forced to relinquish custody of their children to juvenile justice or child welfare agencies exclusively so that the 
children could receive mental health services.  See Hearings before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 
Nowhere to Turn: Must Parents Relinquish Custody in Order to Secure Mental Health Services for Their Children? 
(S. Hrg. 108-169) (July 15 and 17, 2003); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILD WELFARE AND JUVENILE 
JUSTICE: FEDERAL AGENCIES COULD PLAY A STRONGER ROLE IN HELPING STATES REDUCE THE NUMBER OF 
CHILDREN PLACED SOLELY TO OBTAIN MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 2003.
50 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INCARCERATION OF YOUTH, supra note 4, at 5.
51
  Judge Steven Leifman, Miami Dade County Court, Florida, quoted in COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 
PROJECT OVERVIEW, supra note 31, at 2.  See also PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, 
ACHIEVING THE PROMISE: TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 43-44 (2003) (calling current public 
order paradigm the “criminalization of mental illness”).
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B. Financial and Human Costs of Incarcerating People with Mental Illnesses.
“We cannot afford to maintain that practice [of confining violent offenders for 
life] if we continue incarcerating nonviolent offenders or misdemeanants who 
are in prison or jail only because they have a mental illness.”
— Senator Robert Thompson, Chair, U.S. Senate Appropriations 
Committee.52
The confinement of adults and children with mental illnesses in penal facilities comes at 
an extraordinarily high cost to the U.S. economy, not to mention to the people who are 
incarcerated.  The direct costs of the public order response to people with mental illnesses consist 
of the costs of involvement in the criminal justice system from arrest through incarceration and 
release.  Indirect costs consist of the lost productivity of the person with the mental illness (due 
to untreated illness, confinement, and premature death (suicide)), and of the family members 
who provide unpaid care for them.53  An additional and substantial indirect cost is the cost of 
suffering from a major, untreated or undertreated disease.54 Although the total direct and indirect 
costs cannot be calculated using existing data,55 estimates of even the partial direct costs, costs
52
  Senator Robert Thompson, Chair, Senate Appropriations Committee, quoted in COUNCIL OF STATE 
GOVERNMENTS, PROJECT OVERVIEW, supra note 31, at 3.
53
  These estimates of economic cost do not attempt to monetize, and therefore do not account for, indirect but 
important human costs imposed on people with mental illnesses and their families resulting from incarceration, such 
as, e.g., the exacerbation of psychiatric disease in the prison environment, reduced opportunities resulting from the 
fact of prior incarceration, and dignitary and status-related losses resulting from incarceration.
54 See Frank A Sloan, et al., Alternative Approaches to Valuing Intangible Health Losses:  The Evidence for 
Multiple Sclerosis, 17 J. HEALTH ECON., 475, 490 (1998) (calculating intangible losses of suffering from a chronic 
disease, measured on a willingness-to-pay model by sufferers of the disease, as ranging between $375,000 and 
$880,000).  For discussion of methods to value the indirect costs (or intangible losses) imposed by disease, see 
George W. Torrance, Utility Approach to Measuring Health-Related Quality of Life, 40 J. CHRONIC DISEASES 593-
600 (1987); George W. Torrance, Measurement of Health State Utilities for Economic Appraisal, 5 J. HEALTH 
ECON. 1-30 (1986).  These foundational approaches limit their calculations to the intangible costs associated 
narrowly with a disease state, such as suffering; they may not account for additional costs that may be imposed by 
social stigmas related to specific diseases.
55
  Kathryn J. Bennett, et al., Cost-Utility Analysis in Depression: The McSad Utility Measure for Depression Health 
States, 51 PSYCH. SERVS. 1171, 1171 (2000) (stating that cost-utility analysis applied to determining the total 
economic burden of physical diseases has not been widely applied to psychiatric diseases; suggesting applications of 
utility theory to the calculation of the costs of psychiatric illnesses).
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attributable to incarceration alone, are immense:  A conservative estimate, as set forth below, is 
that state prisons spend about $4.75 billion dollars annually exclusively to incarcerate nonviolent 
mentally ill inmates. State governments particularly feel the burden, arguing in a recent report of 
state governments that “the fiscal implications make it impossible to ignore the growing number 
of people with mental illness in the criminal justice system.”56 Federal lawmakers also 
increasingly recognize that criminally confining non-offending and non-violent people with 
mental illnesses imposes massive costs on the criminal system and deprives the economy of the 
productivity that could be liberated through treatment.57
Holding aside justice concerns, the direct and indirect costs of incarcerating offenders 
constitute a rational expenditure, under the classical liberal calculus, if the benefits in public 
safety and deterrence equal or exceed the costs of incarceration.58  Yet, many of the costs 
incurred as a result of the public order response to people with mental illnesses produce no 
quantifiable benefits.  Even insofar as the public order response to people with mental illnesses 
produces utility, the net utility of incarcerating an offender with a severe mental illness relative 
to a matched, non-mentally ill offender will be lower because of the higher costs associated with 
incarcerating the mentally ill person and the reduced impact on deterrence.59
56 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, PROJECT OVERVIEW, supra note 31, at 3. Corrections administrators also 
contend that the incarceration of people with mental illnesses is creating significant budgetary concerns for prisons, 
arguing that “[t]he sooner we get people with mental illness who don’t represent a threat to public safety out of the 
corrections system . . . the more likely we are to realize the savings[.]”  Reginald A. Wilkinson, President, 
Association of State Correctional Administrators, Testimony before the United States Senate Judiciary Committee 
(Jul. 30, 2003) (testimony in support of the Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2003 (S. 
1194)).
57
  Senator Robert Thompson, Chair, Senate Appropriations Committee, quoted in COUNCIL OF STATE 
GOVERNMENTS, PROJECT OVERVIEW, supra note 31, at 3.
58
  It is not within the scope of this Article to ascertain whether incarceration across other offender categories results 
in net costs or benefits to society.
59
  The exception here would be for the small percentage of particularly violent mentally ill offenders whose 
confinement is required on public safety grounds only.  Such offenders comprise approximately three percent of all 
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1. Direct Costs.
Direct costs of responding through the criminal system to the public health and public 
order problems posed by untreated or undertreated mental illness include costs of arrest, jail 
detention, judicial and legal resources, incarceration, and probation costs. Although costs are 
incurred at every step of the criminal process, the major costs result from incarceration in jails 
and prisons.  It is “significantly more expensive to incarcerate individuals with mental illness 
than other inmates” convicted of equivalent offenses.60 In fact, it is about seventy-five percent 
more expensive to incarcerate people with mental illnesses than people without them.61 62 For 
the cost of one mentally ill inmate, a state could incarcerate 1.75 non-mentally ill inmates at no 
budgetary increase.
Beyond higher daily costs, people with mental illnesses also are more costly to 
incarcerate because they are sentenced to and serve longer sentences than other offenders 
inmates with severe mental illnesses.  See CORRECTIONAL ASSOC. OF N.Y., supra note 23, at 13 (I have extrapolated 
from figures provided for the New York City corrections system).  However, it would be reasonable to argue that 
confining such an offender in a secure psychiatric facility would yield a higher net utility than confinement in a 
prison.  This conclusion is consistent with the practice of certain prison systems, which in fact do shift the most 
violent mentally ill offenders out of prisons to secure psychiatric facilities that are better equipped to handle them.
See CORRECTIONAL ASSOC. OF N.Y., supra, at 15-16.
60
  Wilkinson, supra note 56, (testimony before Judiciary Committee in support of the Mentally Ill Offender 
Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2003 (S. 1194)).
61 The average cost of incarcerating an offender in state prison is $80 per day, or $29,200 annually.  Id.
Incarcerating a mentally ill inmate, because of the additional disciplinary, restrictive, medical and other resources 
required, costs approximately $140 per day, or $51,100 per year. Id.  (citing average figures for the state of 
Pennsylvania).  Similarly, the average annual cost to incarcerate a non-mentally ill inmate in New York State is 
about $32,000.  NYS DEP’T OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, 1996-97 PER CAPITA COST REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 
4/01/96-3/31/97.
The daily cost figure cited above is an average across all offenders, both non-mentally ill and mentally ill.  See 
Wilkinson, supra note 56.  Accordingly, the average cost to incarcerate non-mentally ill offenders is less than $80 
per day, as the $80 per day figure includes in it the higher cost of incarcerating mentally ill inmates.
62
  Wilkinson, supra note 56.
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convicted of equivalent crimes.63  Mentally ill offenders on average are sentenced to 12 months 
longer than other inmates in prison for the same categories of offenses.64 Yet, even holding 
sentence length equal, a mentally ill inmate will serve more time:  If  an inmate tries to kill 
himself or herself, or “acts out,” he or she may be placed in solitary confinement, and may have 
time added to his or her sentence.65  Accounting for sentence- and behavior-related factors, the 
average mentally ill inmate serves 15 months longer than a non-mentally ill inmate convicted of 
the same type of offense.66 Longer incarceration affects all categories of mentally ill offenders, 
from felons to misdemeanants.67
More time served means a higher total cost of incarceration.  At the average daily costs of  
$140 per day to incarcerate a mentally ill inmate, the difference in time served costs nearly 
$64,000—above and beyond the costs of the base sentence length for the offense.  These higher 
individual costs add up to staggering overall costs.  Using figures for state prisons alone, the cost 
of incarceration of nonviolent mentally ill inmates is $4.76 billion annually. This estimate does 
not include costs incurred in state jails, federal prisons and jails, and juvenile corrections 
facilities.68  Assuming conservatively that these other systems collectively accommodate one 
63 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES, supra note 4, at 7-8.  See 
also Frank J. Porporino & Laurence L. Motiuk, The Prison Careers of Mentally Disordered Offenders, 18 INT’L J.L. 
& PSYCHIATRY 29, 42 (1995); Michael Winerip, The Way We Live Now: The Juror’s Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES, 
November 21, 1999, at Sec. 6, Page 29.
64 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES, supra note 4, at 8 & Tab 12.
65 CORRECTIONAL ASSOC. OF N.Y., supra note 23, at 7.
66 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES, supra note 4, at 8 & Tab 12.  
On average, a non-mentally ill inmate serves 88.3 months in prison while a mentally ill inmate serves 103.4 months.  
Id. at Tab 12.
67
  Marjorie A. Rock & Gerald S. Landsberg, County Mental Health Directors’ Perspectives on Forensic Mental 
Health Developments in New York State, 25 ADMIN. & POL’Y IN MENTAL HEALTH 327, 327 (1996).
68
  Costs of confining non-offending mentally ill youth in detention centers are not available, but center 
administrators call secure detention centers “the most expensive mental health ward for youth[.]”  HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, INCARCERATION OF YOUTH, supra note 4, at 8.
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quarter the number of nonviolent mentally ill inmates as state prisons, and at equivalent costs, 
then the total annual direct incarceration costs for nonviolent and nonoffending people with 
mental illnesses would be approximately $5.95 billion annually.69
An irony in light of the tremendous taxpayer expense of paying for mental health 
confinement through the criminal justice system is that increased mental health coverage through 
the insurance system would cost very little.  A study by the Rand Corporation found that if 
private insurance plans were to cover psychiatric conditions on the same terms as other physical 
illnesses, the additional cost per worker per year would be one dollar.70
2. Indirect Costs.
The indirect costs of the public order response to mental health issues may exceed the 
direct costs but are more complex to estimate.  The President’s Commission on Mental Health 
estimates that annual economic indirect cost of mental illnesses for the entire U.S. population is 
$79 billion.71 The figure does not include lost utility from poorer quality of life for people 
suffering from untreated or undertreated diseases.  Severe mental illnesses account for nearly 
twenty-five percent of all disability (hence, lost productivity) across industrialized countries,72
while all communicable diseases and all types of cancer each account for less than five percent.73
69
 This estimate does not even capture the consumption of judicial, legal, and police resources involved in 
processing a mentally ill person through the criminal system.
70
  Associated Press, Mental Care Coverage Cost Little, Study Finds, NY TIMES, Nov. 12, 1997 (citing study by 
Rand Corporation).
71 PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION, supra note 51, at 3 (2003) (citing WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 
WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH (2002)). Approximately $63 billion results from lost productivity.  Id.
Most of the remainder consists of $12 billion in mortality costs (that is, lost productivity caused by premature death) 
and $4 billion of lost productivity of care givers (usually uncompensated family members).  Id.
72 Id. at 19.
73 Id. at Fig. 1.1. According to the World Health Organization, suicide “causes more deaths every year than 
homicide or war.” Id. at 20 (quoting World Health Organization) (“suicide is the leading cause of violent deaths 
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These productivity losses do not result directly from a preference for a public order over 
a public health response to mental illnesses.  Yet, they are linked:74  Productivity losses and 
death rates resulting from mental illnesses, as with many other types of illnesses, are not fixed  
but correlate to access to treatment.  Greater rates of treatment ameliorate disease, enhance the 
well-being of the individual and the people in his or her constellation, and reduce productivity 
losses.75
A significant driver of lost productivity is the use of prisons and jails as the primary 
providers of mental health services.  Once released from prison or jail, a mentally ill individual 
experiences the abrupt withdrawal of any treatment he or she received in prison, and 
“decompensate[s]” rapidly into homelessness and re-arrest.76 This use of prisons as primary 
mental health care providers results in “the cycle that has . . . made jails and prisons . . . the new 
psychiatric institutions.”77
The costs of incarceration and associated undertreatment of psychiatric illness, although 
difficult to quantify, are real.  These costs represent an additional category of pure social loss 
because no one “receives” the additional suffering of an untreated mentally ill inmate.  That is, 
assuming society receives benefit from the satisfaction of retributive or other urges toward 
worldwide, outnumbering homicide or war”).  Worldwide, suicide accounts for 49.1% of violent deaths, homicide 
for 31.3%, and war-related deaths for 18.6%.  Id. at 21, Fig. 1.2.
74 PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH, INTERIM REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S NEW 
FREEDOM COMMISSION ON MENTAL HEALTH 1 (2002) (“[T]he ideal mechanism to prevent people with mental 
illness from entering the criminal justice system is the mental health system itself.”).
75 PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION, supra note 51, at 43.  Treatment for mental illnesses also can improve 
quality of life vastly.  As the monetization of quality of life enhancements is speculative, it has not been included in 
calculations here.  However, an account of the benefits of treatment would be incomplete without a consideration of 
the impact on the well-being of people treated.
76 CORRECTIONAL ASSOC. OF N.Y., supra note 23, at 7.
77 Id.
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offenders through their incarceration, no further benefit is conferred by the special suffering of 
one class of prisoners unrelated to their offense.78
3. Decreased Utility from Incarceration.
Classical deterrence rationales cannot account for the disproportionate incarceration of 
people with mental illnesses, nor justify its extraordinary cost.  According to classical deterrence 
theory, the law should punish where, and to the extent that, inflicting punishment maximizes 
social welfare.79  In the liberal formulation, the state is justified in coercing an individual only to 
prevent harm; if incarceration does not further public safety specifically and generally, 
incarceration is not justified.80
Yet, not only are costs higher, the net utility of incarcerating people with mental illnesses 
is lower because the safety and deterrence gains from incarcerating the average mentally ill 
prisoner are lower.  For the substantial number of adults and children with mental illnesses who 
are incarcerated without charge or on fabricated charges, the costs of incarceration are not offset 
78 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1223 (1985) (analyzing 
utility of specific forms of punishment based on whether society “receives” the disutility the offender suffers).
79 JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, in 1 WORKS 126-35 (John Hill Burton ed., 1998) (1843) (asserting 
that whether good or bad, the moral quality of an individual’s motivations or character should not affect punishment 
independently of the individual’s propensity to frustrate the maximization of social welfare). See also RICHARD 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 223-231 (5th ed. 1992) (presenting an economic model to evaluate criminal 
punishment).
The economic model of deterrence originates in eighteenth century legal and economic thought.  Gary S. 
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 209 (1968) (explaining that the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers Beccaria and Bentham “explicitly applied an economic calculus”). The 
standard economic model calculates optimal deterrence as the product of the value of the penalty (p) and the 
probability of detection (pdet), where the value of the penalty depends upon cost, or harm (h), the crime causes. 
David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 736-37, 740 
(2001).  This formula in theory establishes the efficient level of punishment because it creates incentives for an actor 
to obey the prohibition where the predicted punishment cost exceeds the value from committing the offense.  Id.
80 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY passim (John Gray & G.W. Smith eds., 1991) (1859).  See also, John Rawls, 
Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955), reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT: A COLLECTION OF 
PAPERS 110 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969) (“If punishment can be shown to promote effectively the interest of society it is 
justifiable, otherwise is not,” citing LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750: THE MOVEMENT FOR REFORM 1750-1833 (1948)).
Amanda C. Pustilnik Prisons of the Mind 25 - 60
by any gains in public safety or deterrence and thus are a pure loss.  For example, juvenile 
detention facilities alone spend an estimated $100 million each year simply to warehouse without 
treatment non-offending children awaiting mental health services.81  Because the criminal 
confinement of non-offenders cannot serve either deterrence or incapacitation, their confinement
is irrational in economic terms and under classical principles of liberalism and deterrence theory.
The specific deterrence gains from incarcerating mentally ill individuals who have been 
convicted of offenses also are lower.  Specific deterrence as a result of incarceration, as judged 
on recidivism rates, is demonstrably poorer as to mentally ill offenders.  Mentally ill inmates in 
state prisons are nearly ninety percent more likely than non-mentally ill inmates to have been 
convicted of eleven or more prior offenses; in federal prisons, mentally ill inmates are nearly 
three hundred-fifty percent more likely than non-mentally ill inmates to have been convicted of 
eleven or more prior offenses.82
Regardless of the causes of recidivism among this population, 83 the markedly higher 
recidivism rate shows that society receives less specific deterrence benefit from their 
81 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INCARCERATION OF YOUTH, supra note 4, at ii. This estimate does not include any 
of the additional expense in service provision and staff time associated with holding youth in urgent need of mental 
health services.  Id.  See also id. at 9-10 (reporting that over one quarter of detention facilities where youths are held 
for mental health reasons provide no mental health treatment; further reporting that staff at over half of all facilities 
receive “very poor or no training” in handling or treating children suffering from mental illnesses).
82 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES, supra note 4, at 5, Tab 6.  In 
state prisons, ten percent of mentally ill inmates and 5.3 percent non-mentally ill inmates have been convicted of 
eleven or more prior offenses, an eighty-nine percent difference.  Id.  In federal prisons, 9.7 percent of mentally ill 
inmates and 2.2 percent non-mentally ill inmates have been convicted of eleven or more prior offenses, a three 
hundred forty-one percent difference.  Id.
83 Various hypotheses have been advanced to account for the discrepancy in recidivism between mentally ill and 
non-mentally ill offenders. Mental illness itself may prevent a mentally ill offender from being deterrable.  Where 
the biological symptoms of untreated mental illness constitute the offense (as with some nuisance or property 
offenses), the notion of deterrence simply may not apply.  Some researchers contend that the very use of prisons as 
the main source of mental health treatment causes people with mental illnesses to cycle in and out of prison.  
CORRECTIONAL ASSOC. OF N.Y., supra note 23, at 7.
Amanda C. Pustilnik Prisons of the Mind 26 - 60
incarceration relative to other offenders.84  This diminished benefit is not offset by other factors 
such as, e.g., a greater public safety benefit, as at least half of state mentally ill inmates and two-
thirds of federal mentally ill inmates are incarcerated for nonviolent offenses,85 and, as noted, 
many jail inmates may not have committed any offense.  There can be no gain in specific 
deterrence from incarceration where the individual did not offend in the first place.
4. Substitute Response Costs and Benefits.
Responding to problems presented by acute mental illness through law enforcement and 
emergency medical interventions costs more and produces less benefit than an integrated public 
health response.  A study by New York State found that the state can provide complete, 
integrated services for a severely mentally ill person, including supervised housing, daily nurse 
visits, mental health services, and medication, for $25,000 per year.86  This is less than half the 
direct cost of incarceration and one quarter the cost of a combination of ineffective emergency 
room treatment and law enforcement responses.87  Similarly, the President’s Commission on 
Mental Health has found that permanent supportive, supervised housing is cost effective relative 
to the combination of law enforcement and emergency medical responses.88  These substantial 
direct savings do not factor in the economic losses avoided by preventing law-breaking behavior 
84 Posner, supra note 78, at 1223 (discussing deterrence and recidivism).  For Posner’s analysis of the insanity 
defense, see id. at 1223-24.
85 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES, supra note 4, at 4, Tab 5
(showing that approximately one half of mentally ill state prisoners, and two-thirds of mentally ill federal prisoners, 
were incarcerated for nonviolent offenses).
86
   Michael Winerip, Report Faults Care of Man Who Pushed Woman Onto Tracks, N.Y. TIMES, November 5, 
1999, at B1 (citing a confidential New York State report obtained by The New York Times).
87 Id.
88 PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMMISSION, supra note 51, at 42-43 (citing savings of $16,282 per person per year 
of accommodating mentally ill homeless individuals in supportive housing compared to previously-incurred annual 
costs for corrections, shelters, and mental health interventions for the same individuals).  
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and obviating the need to process a mentally ill offender through the criminal justice system 
before and after incarceration. Such an integrated response also may produce actual benefits in 
the form of enhanced economic productivity and individual well-being.
The economic and human problems presented by the public order response to people with 
mental illnesses have not gone unnoticed:  Initiatives and reports by, among others, a presidential 
commission,89 a Congressional commission,90 the U.S. Senate,91 the Department of Justice,92 the 
Department of Health and Human Services,93 the General Accounting Office,94 a commission of 
state governments and corrections officials,95 and major advocacy groups have focused on the 
disutility of a public order response to the issues posed by people with mental illnesses.96 These 
groups uniformly have concluded that addressing problems posed by people with mental 
illnesses through the criminal justice system is harmful and inefficient, and urge that steps be 
taken to relocate the center of intervention from the criminal legal system to the public health 
system.  Yet, no political groundswell has emerged to shift from the public order to the public 
health response and to liberate the value from such a shift.  
89
  Exec. Order No. 13263, 3 C.F.R. 233, supra note 4. 
 
90 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INCARCERATION OF YOUTH, supra note 4. 
 
91
  Wilkinson, supra note 56.
92 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH AND INMATES, supra note 4; BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2003 REPORT, supra note 4 (reporting extensively on mentally ill individuals in prisons and 
jails).
93 DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 4. 
 
94 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 49.
95 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 4. 
 
96
  Among others, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 40; MARTIN DRAPKIN, CIVIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 
MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OF JAIL INMATES WITH MENTAL DISORDERS (2003); CORRECTIONAL ASSOC. OF 
N.Y., supra note 23.
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III. The Social Utility of the Public Order Response to People with Mental Illnesses.
A. The New Chicago School & The “Social Meaning Turn”
“What or whom [a society] values” is shown by what and whom it chooses to punish and 
how severely.97  Value can be implied from punishment, by who is punished relative to whom 
else and to what extent.  The Part above outlined the prevalence of people with mental illness in 
criminal confinement and showed that such people are punished more severely (through longer 
sentences and a higher percentage of sentence served, and, if uncharged or charged on spurious 
grounds, through incarceration without having committed an offense) than their counterparts 
without mental illnesses.  At the same time, public health alternatives place the least burden on 
taxpayers and produce far greater economic utility for the community and well-being for 
individuals with mental illnesses.  The persistence of the public order response in the face of 
public health alternatives indicates that a social value is placed on the criminal confinement of 
people with mental illnesses.
The value placed on the criminal confinement of people with mental illnesses cannot be 
direct economic utility because their incarceration is not value positive.  Rather, it is likely tha t 
the preference for the criminal confinement of people with mental illnesses carries “expressive” 
value.  Legal regimes “are expressive; they carry meanings.”98 The meanings carried and 
reinforced by a legal regime can be termed their “expressive utility,” which can be “incorporated 
into the social-welfare calculus” to assess the efficiency of a legal regime and potential 
alternatives.99  If the public has a taste for the “moral condemnation” of a particular category of 
97 Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, supra note 13, at 614 (internal punctuation 
omitted); see also Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS 
AND MERCY 130 (1988).
98
  Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2021-22.
99 Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, supra note 13, at 620, n.48.
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wrongdoers through the imposition of criminal liability, then the law “creates social welfare . . . 
when the law satisfies that demand[.]”100
The welfare created through the satisfaction of a community’s tastes can transform an 
apparent economic loss into a social surplus, and cause the apparently inefficient practice to be 
highly conserved.  Sunstein illustrates this point in a way that is entertaining but trenchant with 
his analysis of Joel Waldfogel’s economic critique of Christmas.  In Waldfogel’s The 
Deadweight Loss of Christmas, Waldfogel finds that holiday gift exchange results in deadweight 
economic loss because gift givers expend time searching for gifts that exceeds the value 
recipients place on that search time and also because recipients derive less economic value from 
the gift than they would from the same amount of cash.101  Sunstein argues that this critique 
misses the point and constitutes an incomplete economic analysis, both for the same reason:  
Waldfogel fails to account for the social meanings, and concomitant social value, of gift 
exchange instead of cash exchange in the context of Christmas.102  The positive social meaning 
of gift giving fills the “gap” between the deadweight loss found by (at least one) classical 
economic analysis.  Somewhat less whimsically, Kahan similarly demonstrates that the apparent 
economic irrationality of imposing criminal liability on corporations also may be rationalized by 
accounting for the positive value community members place on satisfying their taste for the 
punishment of wrongdoers, even when the wrongdoer is an insensate legal entity.103
100 Id. at 619.
101 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1328 (1993).
102
  Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2036-37.
103 Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, supra note 13, at 618 (citing Daniel R. Fischel & 
Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1996) and V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: 
What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996)).
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Once social meaning is identified as the term that causes an otherwise inefficient practice 
to create social utility, and thus to be conserved, a conclusion is clear:  To change the practice or 
legal regime—whether to advance competing values or to achieve economic efficiencies—the 
specific social meanings that maintain the practice must be put into contest.104
This raises the question of what the social meaning at issue is.  Social meanings are “the 
semiotic content attached to various actions, or inactions, or statuses”—that is, “texts”—“within 
a particular context.”105  Establishing the social meaning of any given text is complex,106 though 
possible.107  Numerous methods of ascertaining the meanings of texts in different contexts have 
been proposed.108  This Article does not purport to ascertain definitively the many meanings of 
mental illness in relation to perceptions of social order.  Yet, drawing on empirical work from 
legal and social sciences scholarship, it suggests that there are two conceptions or models of 
mental illness at play in the culture.  These are the moral/punitive conception, which is the 
dominant model, and the medical/therapeutic conception, which is subsidiary.  
104 Id. at 610 (1998) (“[C]ommunities . . . structure the criminal law to promote the meanings they approve of and to 
suppress the ones they dislike or fear.  Economic analyses that ignore these expressive evaluations produce 
unreliable predictions and uncompelling prescriptions.”)
105
  Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951 (1995).  A social meaning is 
comprised of a “text” and a “context” that gives the text its meaning.  Id. at 958.  Together, the “text, in context, 
activates the association.”  Id.
106
  Bernard E. Harcourt, Measured Interpretation: Introducing the Method of Correspondence Analysis to Legal 
Studies, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 980, 982 (calling the ascertainment of social meaning “one of the greatest challenges 
that interpretive legal scholars and social scientists face”); see also, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and 
Social Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2181, 2188 (1996) (“Meanings are often highly contestable and sometimes hard 
to know.”).  There may be a range of social meanings for any given text.  Lessig, Regulation of Social Meaning, 
supra note 105, at 955 (“Even if there is no single meaning, there is a range or distribution of meanings, and the 
question we ask here is how that range gets made, and, more importantly, changed.”).
107
  Andrew Abbott, Seven Types of Ambiguity, 26 THEORY & SOC’Y 357, 358 (1997) (arguing that social meanings 
are susceptible of rigorous analysis, allowing one to “think formally about the social world”).
108 See, e.g., Harcourt, supra note 106, at 984 (proposing correspondence analysis as a tool for determining social 
meanings).
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Under the moral/punitive model, mental illness is understood as a failure of individual 
responsibility:  People who behave in a manner currently termed “mentally ill” are failing to 
control themselves and must have greater measures of control imposed on them to bring them in 
line with accepted behaviors.  Under the medical/therapeutic view, by contrast, mental illnesses 
are understood as diseases that require and respond to medical treatment, as with any other 
disease.  
The dominant social meaning, this Part argues, which is consistent with the criminal law 
response to people with mental illnesses, has a positive social value that is not captured either in 
economic or rights-based critiques of the public order response to people with mental illnesses.  
It is this positive social value that fills the apparent gap between the existing regime and the 
theoretical, efficient alternative, causing the economically wasteful regime to be preferred to 
treatment-based, cheaper alternatives.  Accordingly, this social meaning will need to be the focus 
of agents who seek to reduce the economic and human costs of the public order-based regime.
B. Two Models of Mental illness: The Moral/Punitive and the Medical/Therapeutic.
Under the moral/punitive conception of mental illness, people with mental illnesses are 
seen as expressing defects of will or character.  Following this view, people who act “mentally 
ill” are failing to control themselves and must have greater measures of control imposed on them 
to bring them in line with accepted behaviors.  The view of mental illness as a moral or character 
failing unites it with the important norm of individual responsibility.  The responsibility norm, 
that all individuals are responsible for their conduct and its consequences except under certain 
narrow exceptions, is foundational to the criminal law (and to the culture more broadly).
Under a view that equates the correction of aberrant behavior by people with mental 
illnesses with reinforcing the important norm of responsibility for one’s conduct, it would be 
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unthinkable to excuse people from the consequences of their actions on the ground of mental 
illness.  The historical and current resistance to conceiving of mental illnesses as being beyond 
one’s control like other diseases springs from the view that doing so would excuse all kinds of 
bad behavior.  The notion is that if “sick” people are excused, then all kinds of bad behavior will 
be deemed “sick.”  This conflation of the “mad” and the “bad,” this argument runs, will bring 
about a state of affairs where no one will be held accountable for bad acts.  This notion that 
mental illness must be policed as a failure of responsibility, and that such punishment reinforces 
the norm of individual responsibility, finds expression in legal scholarship, among mock and 
actual juries, and in the beliefs and actions of lawmakers.  The unacceptability of hospital-based 
confinement as a potential “alternative sanction,” discussed infra, also attests to the primacy of 
the moral/punitive model over the medical/therapeutic.
1. Responsibility Rhetoric Among Scholars, Lawmakers and Community 
Members.
People with mental illnesses are used instrumentally to effectuate and support general 
notions of social responsibility, without taking into account the fact that their actions may have 
been caused by a genuine physical disease.  Richard Bonnie, a scholar who has written 
extensively in favor of restricting or eliminating the insanity defense,109 argues that a narrow 
insanity test has value because it permits the effectuation of normative judgment about individual 
109
  Richard J. Bonnie et al., The Case of Joy Baker, in CRIMINAL LAW 456, 456-65 (Richard Bonnie ed. 1997); 
PSYCHIATRISTS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS: DIAGNOSIS AND DEBATE (Richard Bonnie ed. 1977); Richard J. Bonnie et 
al., Decision-Making in Criminal Defense: An Empirical Study of Insanity Pleas and the Impact of Doubted Client 
Competence, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 48 (1996) (surveying the decision processes of 139 attorney-client
pairs in determining whether to plead insanity); Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: 
Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 MIAMI L. REV. 539 (1993); Richard Bonnie & Norval Morris, Debate: Should the 
Insanity Defense Be Abolished?, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 113, 119 (1986-87); Richard Bonnie, The Moral Basis of the 
Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194 (1983).  Although it is not the purpose of this Article to reprise arguments for an 
against the insanity defense, scholarship and legislative activity around the insanity defense provides a wealth of 
material expressing views of people with mental illnesses and of the relationship between mental illness and 
individual responsibility.  
Amanda C. Pustilnik Prisons of the Mind 33 - 60
responsibility.110  He argues that the Model Penal Code insanity test should be revised to 
eliminate consideration of whether a defendant suffered from a “volitional” impairment resulting 
from a mental disease or defect.111  Bonnie’s objection to the volitional prong is not that it is 
inaccurate.  Rather, he allows that an actor genuinely may lack control over his actions due to 
disease.112  Yet, he contends, even in “compelling cases of volitional impairment,” mentally ill 
actors should be held criminally accountable as if their actions resulted from intent, because their 
exculpation “would be out of touch with commonly shared moral intuitions” about 
responsibility.113
The bias against people with mental illnesses, as well as the inconsistency with liberal 
tenets of justice, in this argument become apparent if one substitutes another illness into 
Bonnie’s arguments.  Imagine now that the disease instead was food poisoning.  Severe food 
poisoning (as readers might know from experience) can cause a person to lose control of bodily 
functions; a person might involuntarily vomit, or worse, in public.  Bonnie’s position, applied to 
food poisoning, would be that a person with severe food poisoning should be criminally 
punished for being sick in public in order to support “shared moral intuitions” about public 
hygiene.  Certainly public hygiene is an important norm, essential to modern collective living.
And diverse types of regulation exist to enforce public hygiene.  But no one suggests that a 
person should be thrown in jail because he or she has food poisoning.
110
  Bonnie, Moral Basis, supra note 109 (emphasis added).
111 Id. at 197.
112 Id.
113 Id.
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Other scholars who advocate the elimination of a defense based on “insanity” argue that 
the defense is both too restrictive and too permissive.  The excuse of insanity is too restrictive 
because, it is claimed, it favors loss of control based on mental illness but fails to extend the 
same latitude to people who have suffered the impact of negative exterior circumstances such as 
poverty, drug use, and child abuse.  It is too permissive,  it is claimed, because once a defense of 
insanity is permitted, then the door is open for any form of hardship to form the basis for an 
excuse from guilt for criminal conduct.  Although most closely associated with Norval Morris, 
this view has had numerous advocates over time.114
Bonnie and Morris represent the two major views on why people with mental illnesses 
should be dealt with in the criminal system.  The first view is that punishment of people with 
mental illnesses serves a purpose, so the impact of mental illness in causing lawbreaking 
behavior is irrelevant.  The second, more widely shared, view is a variation of the familiar 
slippery slope argument: If the law allows any recognition that a person with a severe illness 
cannot control their behavior, then no one will control their behavior, and the world will go wild.  
At the heart of arguments typified by Morris is the idea that mental “illness” is not a real 
phenomenon.  Rather, they imply, “illness” is merely a label applied to people who commit 
blameworthy acts, instead of a set of real and treatable medical conditions distinct from simple 
bad behavior.  This view was encapsulated neatly by a speechwriter for Ronald Reagan, who 
argued:
If you commit a big crime then you are crazy, and the more heinous the 
crime the crazier you must be. . . .  [Y]ou can wait like a jackal and shoot a 
114 NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982).  See also, e.g., RUDOLPH JOSEPH GERBER, THE 
INSANITY DEFENSE 85-89 (1984); SEYMOUR L. HALLECK, PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME: A STUDY OF 
CAUSES, PUNISHMENT AND TREATMENT 212-28, 341-42 (1967); H.L.A. HART, THE MORALITY OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW 24-25 (1964); THOMAS S. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE SOCIAL USES OF 
MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICES 123-46 (1963); Alexander D. Brooks, The Merits of Abolishing the Insanity Defense, 
477 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 125 (1985).
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man in the head and leave him for dead and buy your way out with clever 
lawyers and expensive psychiatrists.  Therefore you are not responsible, 
and nothing is your fault.115
Of course, the statistics on people with mental illnesses in prison and jail show the falsity 
of this view.  People who commit big crimes may or may not buy their way out expensive 
lawyers, but they certainly don’t do it with expensive psychiatrists.  The insanity defense rarely 
is invoked and almost never succeeds.
Intermittently, federal and state legislators introduce bills to eliminate the insanity 
defense based upon its putatively pernicious effect on notions of individual responsibility and 
(equally putative) overuse.116  The comment by a Montana state legislator introducing a bill to 
abolish the insanity defense in his state illustrates: “I believe that criminal law should presume 
that each of us is capable of free choice of behavior. . . .  My purpose with the bill is to hold 
people accountable for their criminal acts.”117
Statements about the importance of limiting the federal insanity defense show that these 
debates are symbolic:  The incidence of insanity defense pleas is so negligible that the only 
impact of narrowing the federal insanity defense would be its symbolic effect in reinforcing 
norms of responsibility and social meanings related to people with mental illnesses.118  Based on 
115 PEGGY NOONAN, WHAT I SAW AT THE REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL LIFE IN THE REAGAN ERA 29 (1990).
116
  Five states have abolished the insanity defense, replacing it with the general mens rea approach common to other 
criminal inquiries.  See Idaho Code § 18-207 (1997); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3220 (1995); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-14-
214 (1999); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 174.035 (Michie 1997); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 (1999).  For a discussion of 
efforts to restrict or abolish the insanity defense for federal crimes, see LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
AND THE TRIAL OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. (1984), and Lincoln Caplan, Not So Nutty: The Post-Dahmer Insanity 
Defense, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 30, 1992, at 18, analyzing insanity defense reform activity.
117
  Comments of Rep. Keedy in Hearings on H.B. 877, Abolition of Mental Disease as a Defense, Before the 
Executive Session of the House Judiciary Committee, 46th Mont. Leg. 12 (Feb. 20, 1979).
118 In a study reviewing nearly one million felony indictments in eight states, an insanity plea was entered in fewer 
than one percent (0.93%) of cases and succeeded in about one quarter of one percent of cases (0.26%).  Lisa A. 
Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. AM. 
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figures like those discussed in the note below, the federal taskforce on the insanity defense, the 
National Commission on the Insanity Defense concluded: “The consensus of the experts is that 
the insanity defense trial is an extremely rare event and a successful insanity defense is even 
more rare.”119
Ronald Reagan’s Attorney General, William French Smith, endorsed a bill proposed by 
Senator Orrin Hatch to “effectively eliminate the [federal] insanity defense,”120 because doing so, 
he argued, would “restore the balance between the forces of law and the forces of 
lawlessness.”121  The “forces of law” would triumph again because eliminating the insanity 
defense would send, he claimed, a strong message that people must be responsible for all their 
actions.122  President Reagan similarly endorsed the bill, opining that not holding people with 
mental illnesses liable for their offenses runs counter to popular feelings about 
“responsibility.”123
ACAD. PSY. &  L. 331, 334-35 (1991).  Another review of half a million felony indictments in four states similarly 
found an insanity plea rate of about one percent and an insanity acquittal rate of about one quarter of one percent.  
HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY; EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE 
REFORM 27-28 tbl.2.2 (1993).  Numerous other studies have produced similar findings.  M. L. Criss and D. R. 
Racine, Impact of Change in Legal Standard for Those Adjudicated Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, 1975-1979, 8 
BULL. AM. ACADEMY OF PSYCH. & AND L. 261 (1980); Richard A. Pasewark, The Insanity Plea: A Review of the 
Research Literature, 9 J. PSYCH. & L. 357 (1981); Richard A. Pasewark, M.L. Pantle, & Henry J. Steadman, 
Characteristics and Disposition of Persons Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity in New York State, 1971-1976, 
136 AM. J. PSYCH. 655 (1979); C.J. Stokman & P.G. Heitrer, The Insanity Defense Reform Act in New York State, 
1980-1983, 7 INT’L J. L. & PSYCH. 367 (1984).  Also, I. K. Packer, Insanity Acquittals in Michigan 1969-1983: The 
Effects of Legislative and Judicial Changes, l3 J. PSYCH. & L. 419 (1985).  These studies are somewhat out of date, 
due to the explosion of interest in the insanity defense after John Hinkley, Jr.’s anomalous insanity acquittal.   State 
and federal insanity defense pleas and acquittals are not regularly tracked or recorded by governmental agencies.  
119 MYTHS & REALITIES: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 15 (1983).
120 CAPLAN, supra note 116, at 111 (1984).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123
  Lou Cannon, Two Years After Shooting; President Bears No Grudge, THE WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 1983, at A1.
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Jurors, too, exhibit the twinned views that mental illness is a failure of individual 
responsibility and that the punishment of people with mental illnesses reinforces the 
responsibility norm.  In one of the largest mock juror studies of decision-making in a capital 
case, different jurors used the actor’s mental illness as a reason for giving a life sentence and for 
imposing a death penalty.  Twenty-four percent of mock jurors imposed death based on a 
normative responsibility concept, stating that “mental illness is no excuse” because all people 
“should be responsible.”124 Eighteen percent imposed death because the defendant’s failure to 
seek help (a demonstration of irresponsibility) caused him to be responsible for his mental illness 
and the consequences that flowed from it.125
Actual insanity defense trials, rare though they are, also demonstrate that jurors equate 
imposing liability on people with concededly severe mental illnesses with supporting the norm of 
individual responsibility.  The case of New York v. Goldstein illustrates.126  Tried twice for the 
murder of a woman he had pushed in front of a subway train, Andrew Goldstein, a paranoid 
schizophrenic, raised a defense of insanity.  The issue before each jury was Goldstein’s 
124
  Lawrence T. White, Juror Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Trial: An Analysis of Crimes and Defense 
Strategies, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 113, 125 (1987). For the raw data, see id. at 124.
125
  Lawrence T. White, Juror Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Trial: An Analysis of Crimes and Defense 
Strategies, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 113, 125 (1987). For the raw data reported, see id. at 124. Twenty percent also 
imposed death on the argument that the defendant was faking: “Defendant is not crazy; could have fooled 
psychiatrist.”  Id.
126
  The case concerns the fatal attack on Kendra Webdale by Andrew Goldstein, a paranoid schizophrenic.  On 
January 3, 1999, after unsuccessfully attempting to gain admission to hospitals throughout New York because he 
claimed he could not control his violent impulses, Andrew Goldstein pushed Kendra Webdale in front of an 
oncoming subway train, killing her.  Julian E. Barnes, Second Murder Trial Opens In Subway Shoving Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, March 4, 2000, at B3.  (For a detailed recounting of Goldstein’s attempts to gain admission at various 
hospitals, see Michael E. Winerip, The Nation: Behind One Man’s Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 1999, at Sec. 4, Page 
3).  His first trial, in October and November of 1999, ended in a mistrial when the jury could not agree on the issue 
of his responsibility under New York’s insanity defense test.  Julian E. Barnes, Insanity Defense Fails for Man Who 
Threw Woman Onto Track, N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 2000, at A1. His second trial, in March of 2000, in which 
Goldstein also raised an insanity defense, resulted in a conviction of second-degree murder.  Id.
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responsibility at the time of his act under New York’s insanity defense test; the first trial resulted 
in a hung jury, while the second resulted in a conviction of second-degree murder.
Although the prosecution conceded that Goldstein suffered acute paranoid schizophrenia,
the prosecution portrayed him as playing on, or playing up, psychiatric symptoms to escape 
responsibility.127  An acquittal would “send a message” that being mentally ill is a “license” to 
commit violent crimes,128 while a conviction would send the message that suffering from mental 
illness does not abrogate responsibility.129  In this way, the prosecution urged the jury to use their 
determination whether a particular defendant could form culpable intent as a vehicle to reinforce 
the norm of responsibility generally.
After the conviction, jurors’ comments showed that they adopted the prosecution’s urging 
to use the responsibility determination about a particular mentally ill individual as a way of 
supporting general norms of responsibility.  Jurors reported crediting testimony that Goldstein 
did not froth at the mouth or drool, and considered his lack of drooling significant to their 
responsibility determination.130  Jurors stated that, although they believed Goldstein was legally 
insane, he was guilty of murder because he threw the victim instead of causing her to fall 
accidentally through “an involuntary movement.”131  The jurors’ cartoonish view of mental 
127
  Julian E. Barnes, Judge Allows Lesser Charge in Trial of Subway Pusher, N.Y. TIMES, March 22, 2000, at B5.  
See also David Rhode, Prosecutors Press Theory That Killer Hates Women, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1999 (stating that 
the prosecution “intensified an already aggressive effort to vilify Mr. Goldstein as a calculating young man who 
used his mental illness to escape punishment for his repeated attacks on women.”).
128
  David Rhode, Mentally Ill Man’s Kin Absent From His Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1999, at Sec. 1, Page 43.
129 Id.
130
  The prosecution emphasized through the testimony of several witnesses that Goldstein did not drool, asking 
Detective William Hamilton, an officer present at Goldstein’s videotaped confession, “Well, was he drooling or 
anything like that?”  Michael E. Winerip, Oddity and Normality Vie in Subway Killer’s Confession, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 19, 1999, at B1.
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illness suggests that they used the concept of “responsibility” as a conduit for evaluative 
judgment and that no set of realistic facts showing mental illness could have influenced them to 
determine that mental illness relieved the defendant of responsibility.132  The principle guiding 
his determination, a juror stated was that “w[e] have to be accountable, all of us, for our 
actions.”133
New York lawmakers reflected public concern about the perceived threat posed by 
people with mental illnesses by framing legislative activity about the people with mental 
illnesses explicitly in terms of “responsibility.”  According to New York governor George 
Pataki, the problem threatening New Yorkers is that the mentally ill are not sufficiently 
“responsible.”134  This use of “responsibility” arises in an ironic counterpoint to the notion of the 
nonresponsibility of people with mental illnesses found in insanity defense tests:  Following the 
liberal principle that criminal liability attaches to culpable intent, a defense of insanity is 
available to individuals who, because of mental illness, did not “intend” the consequences of 
their actions.  Nonresponsibility as used by lawmakers here, however, does not carry the 
exculpatory meaning that people who are “not responsible” because of mental disease or defect 
should be exempt from criminal sanction.  Rather, because the mentally ill may not be 
“responsible” enough to prevent themselves from harming others, the governor argued that they 
131
  Barnes, Insanity Defense Fails, supra note 126, at A1; see also Alan Feuer, Relief for Subway Victim’s Family, 
but a Sense of Duty, Too, N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 2000, at B6.
132
  David Rhode, Subway Jury Deadlocked; Mistrial Ruled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1999, at B1. This view is borne 
out by interviews with two jurors in Goldstein’s first trial voted for acquittal.  Id.  These jurors, a psychiatric nurse 
and a social worker, spoke of responsibility in medical terms instead of legal terms and focused on criteria specific 
to Goldstein instead of the broader relationship between Goldstein’s crime and the community.  Id.  One juror 
reported that the other jurors did not consider his arguments about the influence of mental illness on the defendant’s 
behavior because they were “bloodthirsty.”  Id.  The other juror reported that the other jurors sought to convict 
Goldstein for “impermissible” reasons such as “fear” and “revenge.”  Id.
133
  Barnes, Insanity Defense Fails, supra note 126, at A1.
134 Involuntary Commitment Law Controversial, cnn.com, May 20, 1999 at <<www.cnn.com/kendraslaw.htm/>>.  
Visited on May 20, 1999.
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need additional deterrence to enforce law-abiding behavior.  Proposing a measure to make it a 
jailable offense for a person with a mental illness not to take prescribed medication,135 Pataki 
announced, “[i]f [people with mental illnesses] refuse to act responsibly, we must act to protect 
all New Yorkers.”136  Reinforcing personal responsibility by holding people with mental 
illnesses responsible is important, he stated, to “protect us as a society[.]”137
These legislative activities and statements equating the imposition of criminal liability on 
people with mental illnesses with reinforcing norms of individual responsibility may be seen as 
exercises in symbolic politics.  In the year following its enactment, Kendra’s Law, which 
lawmakers predicted would affect thousands of mentally ill individuals across New York state, 
resulted in the commitment of one person—probably not the definitive factor in keeping the 
public safe.138  The empirical triviality of laws like Kendra’s Law, in contrast to lawmakers’ and 
inflated pronouncements about them, puts the debate on these issues in the same category as 
highly charged but practically inconsequential issues like flag burning.
As Sunstein notes, “the debate over flag burning has everything to do with the statement 
that law makes.”139  The lack of impact on whether people with mental illnesses behave 
135
  N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60 (McKinney 1999) (“Kendra’s Law”).  Kendra’s Law modifies the existing 
outpatient commitment procedures provided for under N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law  § 9.60(a)(1).  Under the law, any 
family member, caregiver, roommate, partner or friend may alert the police that another person is not taking 
prescribed psychiatric medication; that person may then be arrested and brought before a judge and must justify the 
failure to take the medication.  If the judge issues an order for her/him to resume medicating, the individual must do 
so or be subjected to involuntary commitment.  N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.60 (McKinney 1999); see also Jennifer 
Gutterman, Note, Waging a War on Drugs: Administering a Lethal Dose to Kendra’s Law, 68 FORD. L. REV. 2401, 
2401-2 (2000).
136
  Gary Spencer, Kendra’s Law Gets Backing by Both Parties, N.Y.L.J., .May 20, 1999, at 1.
137
  Raymond Hernandez, Pataki Proposes Curb on Releases for Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1999, at A1.
138
  AP Wire Service, Metro News Briefs: Courts Seldom Use Law on Drugs for Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 
2000, at B7 (providing enforcement statistics; calling law a “nonissue”).
139
  Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2044-45.
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responsibly, on deterrence, or on public safety is beside the point because “[m]any debates over 
the appropriate content of law are really debates over the statement that law makes, independent 
of its direct consequences.”140  This is particularly true of debates and statements within the 
criminal law because the “criminal law is a prime arena for the expressive function of law.”141
Jurors’ decisions to convict defendants they acknowledge were legally insane and law 
makers’ efforts to eliminate the insanity defense and to pass legislation specifically aimed at 
mentally ill individuals (whether law-breaking or not) stand out as exercises in symbolic 
politics.142  If citizens and their representatives feel that general norms of personal responsibility 
are compromised when people exhibit the disruptive symptoms of severe mental illnesses, then 
the passage of low-cost, low-impact measures, which reemphasize the public’s commitment to 
personal responsibility and purport to enhance deterrence, may not be inconsistent with certain, 
arguably legitimate, purposes of lawmaking.143 Speaking in the consequentialist idiom of harm 
reduction, terms such as responsibility and deterrence allow the law tacitly to incorporate 
normative judgments of actors and their preferences.144  Thus the criminal law, while appearing 
140 Id. at 2051 (internal punctuation omitted).
141 Id. at 2044-45.
142
  Barbara Ann Stolz, Congress and Capital Punishment: An Exercise in Symbolic Politics, 5 LAW & POL’Y Q. 
157, 158-60 (1983) (discussing the use of certain issues as important for signaling social commitments and 
addressing social fears apart from any direct impact of the measure).  Stolz has argued that congressional contests 
over primarily “symbolic” issues such as capital punishment create social utility through reinforcing shared values 
and commitments to the maintenance of social order.  Id. at 166-67.  Similarly, Seidman and Tushnet have argued 
that legislative action around highly-charged issues, although most frequently expressed in deterrence terms, serves 
more to signal social commitments than to achieve practical impact.  LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. 
TUSHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF:  CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 149, 162-63  (1996) (stating that the 
“[e]xpression of opinion about capital punishment is a way of defining oneself and signaling to others which side 
one is on.”). 
143
  Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 440 (1999) (arguing that such 
“symbolic” exercises can create social welfare through enhancing the public’s sense of well-being). 
 
144 Id. at 415.  Kahan suggests “that the real value” of morally neutral, consequentialist terms (such as 
responsibility) “is to quiet illiberal conflict  between contending cultural styles and moral outlooks.” Id.
Amanda C. Pustilnik Prisons of the Mind 42 - 60
to honor liberal, values through overtly value-free, agreed-upon terms,145 may give effect to 
shared lay norms about various types of offenders.  Judgments about people with mental 
illnesses that lead to their incarceration thus go to the symbolic value of people with mental 
illnesses as a vehicle for the creation of social utility.
2. The Strong Form of the Responsibility Norm and the Defense of “Extreme 
Emotional Distress.”
This normative reasoning about responsibility argues that, if r esponsibility itself is 
challenged through a finding of nonresponsibility, at potentially high cost to the legal system and 
to social order, then no actor ever should be found non-responsible for any lawbreaking act.  Yet, 
the application of this responsibility reasoning, both in doctrine and in practice, shows that 
people with mental illnesses uniquely serve as the foil to the notion of individual responsibility 
and bear disproportionately the expressive weight of the reinforcement of the responsibility 
norm.  
Were there a strong form of the responsibility norm, it would require  that all actors be 
criminally liable for their lawbreaking acts.  In fact, the law and the community at large 
recognize numerous forms of excuse as legitimate to relieve or mitigate criminal responsibility.146
The most interesting of these, in light of the strong responsibility norm applied to people with 
145
  On the importance of law’s use of value-neutral concepts in a diverse society, see generally JOHN RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, Lecture VI (1993); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE 8-12 
(1980).
146
  It is not the purpose of this paper to reprise the law and theory of excuse, and its companion concept of 
justification, which have engendered their own body of scholarship.  For analyses of excuse and justification, see, 
e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 28-53 (1968) 
(providing and discussing the utilitarian account of excuse); Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: On 
Opinionated Review, 87 CALF. L. REV. 943, 966 (1999) (defining and differentiating excuse and justification); John 
L. Hill, A Utilitarian Theory of Duress, 84 IOWA L. REV. 275, 282-87 (1999) (discussing excuse and justification at 
great length, and providing a utility-based account of excuses, particularly duress); Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing 
Justification From Excuse, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (1986) (same).
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actual mental illnesses, is the excuse of “temporary insanity,” also known as “extreme emotional 
disturbance” or “extreme emotional distress” (EED).147
Temporary insanity and EED are excuses that mitigate responsibility.  Although 
sometimes conflated with insanity defenses,148 they nevertheless are not available to people with 
actual mental illnesses.  Rather, as Victoria Nourse, Martha Nussbaum, and Kahan, among 
others, have shown, temporary insanity and EED are modern incarnations of the ancient “heat of 
passion” defense.149  These defenses provide excuses for sympathetic actors who, despite 
breaking the law, may have behaved consistently with prevailing social norms.  Courts and juries 
historically have found defendants “temporarily insane” where social norms concerning the 
defendant’s acts cause the court or jury to feel that the penalty should be mitigated or waived—
the paradigm case being that of the husband who catches his wife in flagrante and kills her or her 
147
  Federal law and the laws of nearly every state contain EED statutes.  See 21 U.S.C. §  848(m)(7) (2000) ("The 
defendant committed the offense under severe mental or emotional disturbance."); Ala. Code §  13A-5- 51(2) 
(Michie 1994 & Supp. 2001); Ariz. Rev. Stat. §  13-703(G)(2) (West Supp. 2004); Ark. Code Ann. §  5-4-605(1) 
(Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002); Cal. Penal Code §  190.3(d) (West 1999 & Supp. 2004); Colo. Rev. Stat. §  18-1.3-
1201(4)(f) (2003); Fla. Stat. Ann. §  921.141(6)(b) (West 2001 & Supp. 2004); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. §  5/9-
1(c)(2) (West Supp. 2002); Ind. Code Ann. §  35-50-2- 9(c)(2) (Michie Supp. 2002) (amended 2002); Kan. Stat. 
Ann. §  21-4626(2) (Supp. 2001); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §  532.025(2)(b)(2) (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2003); La. Code 
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 905.5(b) (West 1997 & Supp. 2004); Miss. Code Ann. §  99-19-101(6)(b) (West 1999 & Supp. 
2001); Mo. Ann. Stat. §  565.032(3)(2) (West 1999 & Supp. 2002); Mont. Code Ann. §  46-18-304(1)(b) (2004); 
Neb. Rev. Stat. §  29-2523(2)(c) (Supp. 2000); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. 200.035(2) (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003); N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. §  630:5(VI)(f) (Michie 1996 & Supp. 2001); N.J. Stat. Ann. §  2C:11-3(c)(5)(a) (West Supp. 2004); 
N.M. Stat. Ann. §  31-20A-6(D) (Michie Supp. 2000); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §  400.27(9)(e) (McKinney Supp. 
2004); N.C. Gen. Stat. §  15A-2000(f)(2) (2001); Pa. Cons. Stat. §  9711(e)(2) (2002); S.C. Code Ann. §  16-3-20 
(C)(b)(2) (West Supp. 2001) (amended 2002); Tenn. Code Ann. §  39-13-204(j)(2) (Supp. 2001); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-207(4)(b) (2003 & Supp. 2004); Va. Code Ann. §  19.2-264.4(B)(ii) (Michie 2000) (amended 2002); Wash. 
Rev. Code §  10.95.070(2) (West 2002 & Supp. 2004); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §  6-2-102(j)(ii) (Michie 2003).
148 See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal Cases, 
86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1204 (2000) (misidentifying Lorena Bobbitt’s temporary insanity claim as an assertion of the 
insanity defense; conflating temporary insanity and insanity defense standards).
149
  Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 
1332 (1997) (stating that lawmakers have “reject[ed] the older talk of ‘heat of passion’ in favor of the more modern 
‘emotional distress.’”); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 307 (1996) (analyzing the heat of passion provocation defense and its limitation to “‘good 
men’” (quoting State v. Cook, 3 Ohio Dec. Reprint 142, 144 (1859)).
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lover.150  As one commentator notes, “From the beginning there was something ironic about the 
temporary insanity defense . . . [because] . . . every one of [the defendant’s] jurors . . . could 
imagine getting pretty steamed after discovering a wife’s infidelity.”151  The “temporary 
insanity” plea thus actually serves as “a claim of normality.”152
Temporary insanity applied primarily to lethal husbands until the middle of the twentieth 
century.153  As an Oklahoma court commented in acquitting a husband for killing his wife’s 
lover:
[A] man of good moral character such as that possessed by the defendant, 
highly respected in his community, having regard for his duties as a 
husband and the virtue of women, upon learning of the immorality of his 
wife, might be shocked, or such knowledge might prey upon his mind and 
cause temporary insanity.  In fact it would appear that such would be the 
most likely consequence of obtaining such information.154
Here, the court expressly links good social performance with qualification for “temporary 
insanity” mitigation:  The court asserts that the more a person conforms with valued 
150
  The first temporary insanity defense in the United States arose in 1859, when a jury acquitted Representative 
Daniel E. Sickles, a congressman from New York, of shooting his wife’s lover.  Sickles did not deny the killing but 
argued his wife’s infidelity had caused in him an “insanity” to kill her lover.  The jury, whether or not accepting 
Sickles became “insane,” concluded that Sickles’ wife’s lover “got what he deserved.”  David Margolick, At the 
Bar; Madness as an excuse: Two Similar Arguments in the Same Court, with Starkly Different Results, NY TIMES, 
Jan. 28, 1994 at B18 (quoting Lawrence Friedman).  For a more fulsome discussion of the case, see Robert Wright, 
A Normal Murder, NEW REPUBLIC, Jul. 11, 1994 at 6.
151
  Wright, supra note, 150 at 6.
152 Id.
153
  Another area in which temporary insanity often applies is infanticide, a crime that may provoke significant 
empathy.  Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern American Infanticide, 34 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 13 (1996), citing George K. Behlmer, Deadly Motherhood: Infanticide and Medical Opinion in 
Mid-Victorian England, 34 J. HIST. MED. & ALLIED SCI. 403, 413 (1979).  French infanticide law of the eighteen 
hundreds similarly recognized “folie passagere”—literally, temporary insanity—as a complete defense to 
infanticide, which at that time carried a capital penalty.  James M. Donovan, Infanticide and the Juries in France, 
1825-1913, 16 J. FAM. HIST. 157, 169 (1991).
154 Hamilton v. State, 244 P.2d 328, 335 (Okla. Crim. App. 1952).
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social norms, the more likely he is qualify as “temporarily insane” when breaking the law 
to protect valued social norms.
Early American and English law, drawing implicitly upon a traditional “code of 
honor,”155 defined a set of situations socially acknowledged to constitute sufficient provocation 
for an honorable man to kill.156  (H.L.A. Hart, for example, expressly relied on “human nature” 
for his conclusions about what justifiably could provoke a man to kill, concluding that men are 
“capable of self-control when confronted with an open till but not when confronted with a wife 
in adultery.”157)  Temporary insanity also has come to excuse illegal conduct arising under 
newly-sympathetic fact patterns such as killings or batteries by female victims of domestic 
violence.158  While this marks a cultural transformation, the nature of the defense remains the 
same:  It provides an excuse to those who behave consistently with community norms, although 
the underlying norms may change over time.
Like temporary insanity, EED was born in the bedroom.159 While the MPC’s EED 
defense does not recognize specific situations as de jure sufficient to provoke the reasonable 
person, it does apply to specific people under limited circumstances:  It evaluates the sufficiency 
155
  Nourse, supra note 149, at 1340-41.
156 SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 413 (6th ed. 1995) (“The 
long-standing common law rule . . . permits the jury to find adequate provocation mostly in a few narrowly defined 
circumstances.”).  The circumstances, known as the “nineteenth century four,” included adultery, violent assault, 
mutual combat, and false arrest.  Id.  Conversely, “mere words” and other “trivial” provocation were excluded. Id.
157 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 33 (1968) (Hart’s consideration of the nature of adequate 
provocation was restricted to men, and, presumably, to heterosexual men).
158
  For a discussion of the relationship between temporary insanity claims and domestic violence, see, e.g., ANNE 
JONES, WOMEN WHO KILL 287-89 (1980) (discussing the landmark Karen Hughes case, the first case in which 
domestic violence was raised as a defense); Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1, n.275 
(2000); Marina Angel, Criminal Law and Women: Giving the Abused Woman Who Kills a Jury of Her Peers Who 
Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229, 292-4 (1996).
159
  Nourse, , supra note 149, at 1332 (stating that lawmakers have “reject[ed] the older talk of ‘heat of passion’ in 
favor of the more modern ‘emotional distress.’”).
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of the provocation from the perspective of a reasonable person in the same position as the 
defendant.160  The drafters articulated their intent that the EED defenses apply to the “ordinary” 
and “reasonable” person who finds him/herself affected by a “provocative circumstance” that he 
or she did not create.161  By its plain language, this defense does not apply to people who suffer 
an “emotional disturbance” preceding or separate from the “provocative circumstance” but is 
available to “ordinary” people who find themselves the victim of circumstances.  Temporary 
insanity and EED share the central notion that “ordinary,” “reasonable,” non-mentally ill 
defendants are less culpable when they lose “self-control”162 — but only for “the right 
reasons.”163
The core of these excuses, then, lies not in excusing loss of control but in granting limited 
permission to violate the law in the service of protecting core social values, in specific instances 
where lawful conduct and virtuousness conflict.164 Were there a “strong” form of the 
responsibility norm, temporary insanity and EED defenses would not mitigate the punishment of 
160
  MPC § 210.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).  Ten states have adopted the subjective MPC standard to 
determine adequacy of provocation. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1504 (1977); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-54a, 53a- 55 (West Supp. 1984); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 632 (1979); HAWAII 
REV. STAT. § 707-702 (1976); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 507.020-030 (1975); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:2 (1955); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW §§ 125.20(2), 125.25 (1)(a) (McKinney 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-02 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 163.118 (1983). 
161
  MPC § 201.3 commentary at 47-48 (Tentative Draft 1959), quoted in Nourse, , supra note 149, at 1339 (stating 
that lawmakers have “reject[ed] the older talk of ‘heat of passion’ in favor of the more modern ‘emotional 
distress.’”).  The comment reads, “That the provocative circumstance must be sufficient to deprive a reasonable 
or an ordinary man of self-control, leaves much to be desired since it totally excludes any attention to the special 
situation of the actor. . . .  Formulation in the draft affords sufficient flexibility to differentiate between those 
special factors in the actor’s situation which should be deemed material . . . and those which properly should 
be ignored.”  Id
.
162 Id.
163
  Analyzing heat of passion provocation requirements, Kahan and Nussbaum point to the common law’s  
limitation of this defense to the upright and sound  actor, by “‘insisting . . . that killings . . . proceed [not] from a bad 
or corrupt heart, [but] rather from the infirmity of passion to which even good men are subject.’”  Kahan & 
Nussbaum, supra note 149, at 307 (quoting State v. Cook, 3 Ohio Dec. Reprint 142, 144 (1859)).  See also, id. at 
313-319 (arguing generally that the law excuses where the defendant loses control for the “right reasons” but 
punishes more severely if he or she engages in the same act for the “wrong reasons”).
164 Id.
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individuals who break the law, and even kill, in the face of a “provocative circumstance.”  Yet, 
even nonviolent and non-offending people with mental illnesses are incarcerated in the name of 
enforcing “responsibility.”  This undercuts the notion that a strong form of the responsibility 
norm is responsible for the incarceration of any and all lawbreakers separate from their intent, 
but points rather to the over-detention specifically of people with mental illnesses  in the name of 
“responsibility.”
3. Hospital-Based Commitment as an Unacceptable Alternative Sanction. 
As shown above, scholars, lawmakers, and community members directly express the 
view that mental illness is a failing of the person with the disease and that the punishment of 
people with mental illnesses serves to support popular norms of responsibility.  The view that 
mental illnesses are conceived of under a moral/punitive model, not a medical/therapeutic model, 
further is evidenced by the rejection of civil confinement of people with mental illnesses as a
potential “alternative sanction.” 
Neither hospital-based confinement as a potential alternative to jailing non-charged 
and/or nonviolent mentally ill adults and children nor commitment resulting from an insanity 
acquittal have been considered previously in the extensive literature on alternative sanctions.  
Civil commitment diverges from other alternative sanctions in that it is a civil disposition 
resulting in confinement, while other alternative sanctions are criminal penalties that may or may 
not result in confinement.  Yet, civil commitment shares features with conventional alternative 
sanctions.  Its identity as a civil disposition makes it similar to the alternative criminal sanction 
of fines, which are prevalent in the civil context, while the imposition of potentially therapeutic 
hospital-based supervision makes it similar to other potentially rehabilitative sanctions like 
community service.  Further, the possibility of out-patient “commitment,” where the mentally ill 
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individual receives mandatory treatment while living at home or in an open facility, shares 
features with the alternative sanctions of home confinement or of mandatory treatment at a 
substance abuse center.  
Following a classical consequentialist analysis, under which deterrence and 
incapacitation should be able to justify any given confinement regime, the civil confinement of 
people with mental illnesses should be preferable to incarceration.   If the deterrent harm 
imposed incarceration is the loss of liberty itself, then the loss of liberty imposed by indefinite 
civil commitment should deter as well as or better than a fixed term of incarceration.  Civil 
commitment may visit a greater deprivation of liberty upon its object than criminal confinement.  
First, it confines more:  The length of civil commitment is indefinite and, on average, lasts longer 
than a criminal sentence for the same offense.165  Second, it visits a greater invasion of autonomy 
on the inmate than prison:  Psychiatric hospitals may impose on inmates an array of restraint and 
disciplinary tools prohibited in prisons.166 Moreover, empirical studies demonstrate that 
commitment is a less appealing alternative to charged mentally ill offenders than 
incarceration.167
With the longer average deprivation of liberty and potentially greater invasion of 
autonomy, commitment should incapacitate and deter as well or better than incarceration.  
Commitment also may produce utility more broadly through realizing an improved outcome for 
the mentally ill individual, allowing him or her to return to productivity.  If deterrence and 
165 See notes 63-64, supra, and accompanying text.
166 A hospital may, in a fitting case and under limited circumstances, administer electric shocks, psychotropic 
medication, or total bodily restraint.
167 CORRECTIONAL ASSOC. OF N.Y., supra note 23, at 11 (noting that “some defendants with serious mental illness 
refuse to permit their defense attorneys to interpose a NGRI defense . . . because they prefer incarceration to long-
term hospitalization.”).
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incapacitation were the chief concerns addressed by incarcerating mentally ill offenders, the 
criminal system should abundantly employ hospital-based confinement, as it imposes a greater 
objective and perceived disutility on the offender and enhances public safety, all at lower cost.
Because incarceration produces lower social utility than commitment when analyzed 
within the consequentialist framework, any preference for imprisonment points to the superior 
power of imprisonment over therapeutic alternatives to meet criminal law goals that relate to 
satisfying public tastes. That is, civil commitment fails similarly to other, conventional 
alternative sanctions because it fails to signal condemnation and fails to signal unequivocally 
support for the norm that is reinforced by the punishment of the population that is the target of 
the alternative sanction. This is because “[c]riminal law produces utility not just by deterring 
crime but also by constructing valued social meanings.  Forms of affliction that may be 
equivalent for deterrence purposes may be radically disparate in their expressive value.”168
Alternative sanctions are least likely to displace incarceration where the alternative 
carries a positive association instead of a punitive one.169  The expectation that 
punishments should condemn, whether or not they deter and incapacitate, makes the 
acceptability of a sanction turn on the community’s evaluation of whether the social meaning of
the sanction and of the actor or offense match.  Experience with alternative sanctions 
demonstrates that, to gain public and legislative acceptance, a criminal sanction must 
unequivocally go beyond protecting the public to expressing condemnation of the actor.170  A 
sanction such as civil commitment that does not express the condemnation distinctively 
associated with imprisonment, even if superior in cost-efficiently achieving deterrence and 
168 Id. at 617 (1998).
169
  Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 625 (1996).
170 Id. 
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public safety, fails to achieve public buy-in.171  Thus, when considered under the moral/punitive 
model of mental illness, the notion that large-scale shifts of people with mental illnesses from 
punitive to medical confinement could better achieve deterrence and incapacitation seems 
perverse, and the preference for confinement, despite the lack of consequentialist justification for 
it, seems rational.
IV. Enforcing Order and Punishing Deviance through Incarceration of People with 
Mental Illnesses.
The fact of punitive confinement, more than any other, embodies the history of the 
treatment of people with mental illnesses.172 While punitive confinement and therapeutic 
confinement both place people with mental illnesses apart from the general community, punitive 
confinement does so out of concern not for people such illnesses but for other community 
members.  This distinction marks out the difference between the therapeutic or medical model 
and the punitive model—that is, whether people are separated from the general community for 
their own benefit, or whether they are separated for the greater comfort of those who prefer not 
to have such people among them.  Pervasive punitive confinement and the unacceptability of 
treatment-based alternatives points towards the connection between the social meanings of 
mental illness and incarceration, and, accordingly the role that the incarceration of people with 
mental illnesses plays in creating certain social meanings and reinforcing certain social norms.
The history of the punitive confinement of people with mental illnesses has been 
addressed by scholars working in cultural history and in the history of science and medicine.173
171 Id.
172
  This assertion reprises, generally, the augment advanced by Michel Foucault in Madness and Civilization: A 
History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (Richard Howard trans., 1988) (1965).
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This Section does not attempt to restate this extensive body of scholarship but draws upon it to 
illustrate that the primary method of dealing with people with mental illnesses throughout 
Western history has been punitive confinement.  This history serves to support this Article’s 
claim that a moral/punitive model of mental illness is in fact dominant in the culture and the 
related claim that attempts to relocate people with mental illnesses from punitive confinement to 
therapeutic alternatives must contend with this conception before it will be possible to create 
meaningful change.
Like mental illness, confinement to a prison, too, carries social meaning.  Although the 
criminal system imposes incarceration for almost every offense,174 incarceration is not a 
necessary form of incapacitation or affliction. A sanction need only signal in a generally-
understood way the community’s condemnation; any reliable form of incapacitation could 
promote public safety and a universe of afflictions could promote general and specific 
deterrence.175  Rather, forms of punishment are culturally contingent.176  Prison alone, a 
substantial body of scholarship argues, uniquely symbolize collective disgust, serving as the 
place for, and as metaphor of, the disposal of society’s “filth.”177  Disgust relates to norm 
173
  Among numerous excellent works, see, e.g., ROY PORTER, MADMEN: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF MADMEN, MAD 
DOCTORS, AND LUNATICS (2004); DANIEL N. ROBINSON, WILD BEASTS & IDLE HUMORS: THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE PRESENT (1996); GERALD N. GROB, THE MAD AMONG US: A HISTORY OF THE CARE OF 
AMERICA’S MENTALLY ILL (1994); FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION, supra note 172.
174 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS Tab 2 (Jan. 1995) (seventy percent of 
felons sentenced to incarceration).
175
  A wrongdoer committing the same act in different times or places could be subject variously to the stocks, 
imprisonment, whipping, hanging, or the guillotine, among other punishments.  See generally, THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman
eds. 1995) (documenting the different forms of criminal punishment throughout European and American history).  
176 Id.
177 MARTHA GRACE DUNCAN, ROMANTIC OUTLAWS, BELOVED PRISONS: THE UNCONSCIOUS MEANINGS OF CRIME 
AND PUNISHMENT 146 (1996).  See also generally, e.g., ELIZABETH S. ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND 
ECONOMICS (1993); Jean Hampton, An Expressive Theory of Retribution, in RETRIBUTIVISM AND ITS CRITICS (W. 
Cragg ed., 1992); Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY ch. 4 (Jeffrie G. Murphy 
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reinforcement:  While “[f]ear [is a] react[ion] to transgressions against one’s own person, . . . 
disgust takes aim at . . . the threat that open deviance poses to the status of those who faithfully 
abide by dominant norms.”178
Incarceration, confinement to the place of disgust, shows the community’s disgust for the 
offender in response to his or her deviance.  Where the offense of conviction is nonviolent, and 
there may be little to fear from the offender, confining an offender to prison may satisfy 
collective disgust and honor norms of responsibility and order more than accomplishing any 
consequentialist purpose for imprisonment.
The first permanent places for the confinement of the severely mentally ill, originating in 
the early Renaissance, were distinctly punitive in character as well as evocative of moral stigma.  
Towns and villages began to ship their mentally ill to leprosariums left empty by the subsidence 
of leprosy.  Although sending people with mental illnesses to leprosariums may seem akin to 
sending them to hospitals, the meaning of the leprosarium was unambiguously condemnatory:  
The Church and community understood leprosy as a mark of sin, requiring sufferers’ expulsion 
from the community; thus leprosariums were conceived of in moral, not health-related, terms.179
Converted leprosariums gained symbolic value during the Renaissance and early Enlightenment 
as places for the correction of the morally blameful as they developed into actual houses of 
correction, the precursors of prisons.  In these places, the mentally ill and others confined for 
social deviance ranging from profligacy to drunkenness received corporal punishment and 
& Jean Hampton eds. 1988); MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 12-13 (trans. 
Alan Sheridan, 1977) (discussing the ability of forms of penal affliction to convey social relationships); Kahan, 
Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, supra note 13, at 616 (“Imprisonment unmistakably expresses 
moral indignation because of the sacred place of liberty in our culture”).
178
  Dan M. Kahan, Book Review, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1621, 1637 (1998) 
(reviewing WILLIAM IAN MILLER, THE ANATOMY OF DISGUST (1997)).
179
  Accordingly, the Church forbade lepers from taking Holy Communion, including in churches serving only leper 
colonies.  FOUCAULT, supra note 172, at 38.
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participated in forced work regimes.  These houses of confinement for the “immoral” are the 
direct ancestor of the prison and the insane asylum, but not of the medical hospital.  In the Royal 
Edict of 1665, Louis XIII established “hôpiteaux” for the confinement of the mad and disorderly, 
the indigent, debtors, vagrant or abandoned children, prostitutes and other sexually transgressive 
women, and a mélange of other deviants.180
Although these institutions were some of the first to bear the name “hospital,” “the 
Hôpital Général [was] not a medical establishment . . . [and] had nothing to do with any medical 
concept.”181  The edict establishing the hôpiteaux makes their punitive nature clear through 
authorizing the director to institute disciplinary regimes to correct the inmates, including the use 
of “stakes, irons, prisons, and dungeons . . . so much as [directors] deem necessary[.]”182
Directors of the hôpiteaux came from the ranks of law enforcement and included such figures as 
the Chief of Police.183
In England and Germany in the fifteen and sixteen hundreds, similar acts authorized the 
creation of “houses of correction” and of Zuchthäusern, respectively, for the confinement of 
180 FOUCAULT, supra note 172, at 40. The Edict of 1676 nationalized the regime, requiring each city to establish and 
maintain a hôpital.  Id. at 41, citing Edict of June 16, 1676.  Institutions established by the first edict include the 
Hôpital Général, La Salpêtrière, and Bicêtre.  Id.  At about the same time, the Diocese of Paris established Sainte-
Lazare and a collection of other confinement houses out of its “lazar” or leper houses, perpetuating the identification 
between people with mental illnesses and lepers.  Id. at 42.  Readers may recognize La Salpêtrière and Bicêtre as the 
institutions where Philippe Pinel and François Charcot would identify the phenomenon of hysteria and where 
Sigmund Freud developed many of his theories of neurotic illness.  Despite their place in the history of psychiatry, it 
is unlikely that contemporaries of these institutions would have identified them being specifically “mental” asylums 
instead of penal institutions.  As Alan Gauld describes it, the “Salpêtrière was an immense complex . . . almost a 
town in its own right inhabited by . . . a total 5000 persons” including “the destitute,” “the senile,” “prostitutes,” and 
“the insane.”  ALAN GAULD, A HISTORY OF HYPNOTISM 308 (1992).  Through the 1800s, a significant purpose of 
these institutions was the confinement of prostitutes and other female “degenerates,” defined as those who departed 
from societal expectations about female sexual conduct.  THOMAS LACQUER, MAKING SEX: BODY AND GENDER 
FROM THE GREEKS TO FREUD 241-43 (1992).
181 FOUCAULT, supra note 172, at 40.  About ten percent of the residents of the Hôpital Général in Paris consisted 
of “the insane,” “individuals of wandering mind,” and the “completely mad.”  Id. at 65.
182 Id., citing the Edict of 1656, Art. XII.
183 Id. at 41.
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deviants including the mentally ill, disorderly, sexually wayward, and indigent.184 Zuchthaus 
translates as house of correction and is in contemporary parlance a word for “penitentiary.”185
But the sense conveyed by zucht- is more far-ranging and actually implies the relationship 
specifically between mental disorder and punitive confinement:186 Zucht- implies the sense of 
the way things should be, the natural order.187  That which is unzucht violates the social order: 
unzucht carries the meaning of that which transgresses against social norms.188  Thus that which 
violates the order of things (die unzucht) is that which penal confinement ( Zuchthausstrafe) 
restores.  That people with mental illnesses were the first to be confined in Zuchthäusern
suggests that they are the basic deviants, the essential subject for re-ordering.  In the creation of 
the Zuchthaus for people with mental illnesses, and the construction of people with mental 
illnesses as die unzucht, we see the basic expression, at a linguistic and historical level, of the 
social meaning of mental illness as a public order problem requiring punitive correction for the 
reestablishment of valued social norms.  
184 Id. at 43.
185 ENGLISH-GERMAN DICTIONARY, online with no additional title or editor.  Available at 
<<http://www.de.freebsd.org/~wosch/dict/dict.cgi?query=zucht&plang=en&db=tuc&lang=2&db=tuc&icase=1&wh
olewords>>.  Visited on April 27, 2001.
186
  Despite evolving in the eighteen hundreds into the term for penitentiary, Zuchthaus retained through the middle 
of the twentieth century the connotation of a place for confining the mentally ill.  Interview with Dr. Alexander 
Karp, Researcher, Freud Institute, Frankfurt Am Main, April 10, 2001.  During the Third Reich, the National 
Socialist party frequently found those who opposed the Party, and thus who deviated from the social order, to be 
“mentally ill” (verrückt; geisteskrank)—instead of criminal (Verbrecher)—and confined in Zuchthäusern for “re-
ordering.”  Id.  The Zuchthäusern  of the Third Reich carried almost exclusively the connotation of “mental 
institution.”  Id. Following World War II, the term has fallen out of use as a word to describe a prison or jail. Id.
187 Die zucht can mean a breed, an order, culture, or discipline.  THE NEW ENGLISH-GERMAN DICTIONARY, online 
with no additional title or editor information.  Available at <<http://www.iee.et.tu-dresden.de/cgi-
bin/cgiwrap/wernerr/search.sh?string=zucht&nocase=on&hits=50>>. Visited on April 27, 2001.  Aufzucht means 
well-bred, while selbzucht implies self-generated conformity with that which should be.  Id. at 
<<http://www.de.freebsd.org/~wosch/dict/dict.cgi?query=zucht&plang=en&db=tuc&lang=2&db=tuc&icase=1&wh
olewords>>.
188 THE NEW ENGLISH-GERMAN DICTIONARY, supra note 187, at <<http://www.iee.et.tu-dresden.de/cgi-
bin/cgiwrap/wernerr/search.sh?string=zucht&nocase=on&hits=50>>.  A contemporary legal meaning of the term 
also is “sex crime.”  Id.
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Similarly, throughout the seventeen and eighteen hundreds in Europe and the United 
States, the incarceration of people with mental illnesses for general deviance was a constant 
feature.  John Howard, an early mental health reformer, who at the end of the eighteenth century 
surveyed centers of confinement (“workhouses, prisons”) in England, Germany, France, Spain, 
Italy, and the Netherlands found the mad, and the indigent, and the convicted confined together 
without distinction.189  These confinement centers, Howard’s study showed, existed to reinforce 
social order through “eject[ing] . . . all forms of social uselessness.”190
In parallel to this history of mental illness as a public order problem addressed through 
confinement, certain Enlightenment medical practitioners began to advance a competing model 
for understanding mental illnesses as afflictions equivalent to other physical illnesses. 
Interestingly, this medical/therapeutic conception developed in explicit contrast to the moral 
conception and penal treatment of people with mental illnesses.191  For example, Dr. William 
Battie, an English physician, expressed in 1758 the emergent medical view of mental illness as 
being akin to “other distempers, which are equally dreadful and obstinate, . . . and such unhappy 
objects ought by no means to be . . . shut in loathsome prisons as criminals . . . .”192  These 
practitioners for the first time decried the confinement of the mentally ill in houses of correction 
and began to develop specialized, quasi-medical facilities for people with mental illnesses—
“asylums.”193
189 FOUCAULT, supra note 172, at 44-45.
190 Id. at 58.
191 GROB, supra note 173, at 25-53 (charting the rise of medicalized understandings of mental illness in England, 
France, and the United States, and the concomitant development of treatment-oriented institutions specifically for 
the mentally ill).
192 WILLIAM BATTIE, A TREATISE ON MADNESS (1758), quoted in GROB, supra note 173, at 24.
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But even in asylums, the medical/therapeutic conception did not unambiguously 
triumph over the moral/punitive conception, as these institutions continued to represent a 
conception of mental illness as being at least as much a moral problem as a medical one.  Most 
strikingly attesting to this ambivalence, the Association of Medical Superintendents of American 
Institutions for the Insane, an organization founded in 1844 by the superintendents of several 
asylums, did not include any doctors or others with medical training.194  Rather, asylum 
superintendents consisted of men with religious and philanthropic backgrounds who instituted 
“treatment” regimes on a disciplinary model.195
Chronicling the disciplinary nature (and lack of professionalism) of these putatively 
therapeutic establishments, Dr. Edward Charles Spitzka, an early campaigner for the 
medicalization of the treatment of people with mental illnesses, inventoried the conditions at one 
New York asylum, finding:
During the current year . . . [t]hree patients beaten to death, one of 
whom has twelve ribs broken!  One patient boiled to death, . . . and 
several patients drowned!196
* * *
The institutional history of mental illness is remarkably complex and various but a 
constant is that mental illness itself, apart from any independent criminal act, has brought and 
continues to bring mentally ill actors within punitive confinement.  Because incarceration is the 
primary symbol of separateness from the community, the mentally ill individual, who is by 
definition deviant in some way, becomes a “proper” subject of imprisonment.  
193 GROB, supra note 173, at 24.  
194 CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE TRIAL OF THE ASSASSIN GUITEAU: PSYCHIATRY AND LAW IN THE GILDED AGE 60-
62 (1968).  In fact, the Association specifically refused to allow neurologists to join the Association or care for 
inmates.  Id.
195 Id. 
196 Id. at 73.
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V. Conclusions and Future Directions.
To summarize:  There is a dominant conception of mental illness as reflecting a defect of 
morality or will.  People with mental illnesses are seen, not uniformly but predominantly, as 
expressing a culpable failure to conform one’s behavior to social norms.  The association of 
mental illness with social irresponsibility makes it expressively rational to reinforce the 
responsibility norm by punishing people with such illnesses.  Most of these exercises in punitive 
confinement and symbolic lawmaking actually have minimal impact on deterrence and public 
safety.  The emphasis on the symbolism of punishment, through criminal confinement, over its 
actual effect is shown by the unacceptability of civil confinement as an alternative sanction.  
Separately, there may be a preference for punishing people with mental illnesses, as shown 
through the existence of established excuse categories for law-breaking actors who do not suffer 
from mental illnesses (e.g., “temporary insanity”).  
Under the currently prevailing social meaning ascribed to people with mental illnesses,
their punishment may create social utility through the reinforcement of the responsibility norm.  
In this fashion, the essential norm of individual responsibility can be reinforced effectively 
through exercises in symbolic politics affecting a relatively small and voiceless minority.  
Relatedly, as long as the social meanings associated with mental illness arise under the 
moral/punitive paradigm instead of the medical/therapeutic paradigm, evaluative judgment will 
locate mentally ill actors in penal, rather than medical, confinement.
Expressive theory argues that effective reforms to the criminal system must pay attention 
to the social meanings of criminalized behaviors and penal affliction.  Bringing about change is 
as much a matter of changing social meanings as of changing doctrine; the only doctrinal 
changes that will be effective are those that are sensitive to social meanings and that present their 
Amanda C. Pustilnik Prisons of the Mind 58 - 60
proposals in ways that are consonant with the normative judgments of the community.  In this 
case, it is not merely the meaning of forms of punishment that must be considered, as with the 
implementation of alternative sanctions for other categories of offenders, but, importantly, the 
cultural meanings of mental illness and of the intersection of mental illness with confinement.  
This Article opened with the question: Why do we primarily deal with mentally ill people 
through the criminal justice system when incarceration is an economically inefficient and 
morally problematic way to address mental illness?  Why do we, as a society, pay a minimum of 
$6 billion per year to criminally confine nonviolent or non-offending adults and children with 
mental illnesses?  The short answer is that we want them there.
If we believe that social institutions match and reinforce social meanings, then it is the 
intersection of the cultural perception of the mentally ill as culpably deviating from valued 
norms, and of the criminal system as appropriate to norms of responsibility and of order 
generally, that, logically, leads to the localization of the mentally ill in the criminal system.  
Every criminal law rationale and doctrine relating to the mentally ill traced within this Article 
substantiates this contention: deterrence arguments with no rational relationship to deterrence 
ends; incapacitation arguments that favor the less effective form of incapacitation; responsibility 
tests that do not ascertain individual responsibility; economic rationales for grossly wasteful 
resource allocations; and the doctrine of the insanity defense that purports to divert the mentally 
ill but that funnels them into criminal confinement.
Using expressive theory to examine why the paradoxes above not only are acceptable but 
largely unexamined, this Article makes several claims about how the criminal system works 
relative to the mentally ill: The criminal system is the primary institution that deals with people 
with mental illnesses in the United States, at a cost of billions of dollars per year.  The use of the 
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criminal system instead of, for example, public health or private medical alternatives, is not 
rationally related to public safety or deterrence.  Insofar as decision-makers such as jurors or 
lawmakers do evaluate mental illness, that evaluation is a judgment upon the general relationship 
between mental illness and “responsibility,” not an evaluation of any causative effect of illness 
on a specific individual’s acts.  Viewing people with mental illnesses as violators against norms 
of responsibility and social order—as unzucht—our culture identifies the mentally ill as 
appropriate subjects of reordering through punitive confinement (location in Zuchthäusern). A
“strong form” of the responsibility norm is not the cause of the over-incarceration of people with 
mental illnesses, as shown by the existence of excuse categories that mitigate culpability but that, 
by their plain language, to not apply to people with mental illnesses.  The instrumental use of 
people with mental illnesses as symbols for the reinforcement of social commitments to personal 
responsibility may create social utility, but at what should be an unacceptable financial and 
human cost.
Bringing about change in the treatment and disposition of people with mental illnesses is 
as much a matter of changing social meanings as of changing doctrine.  The proposals that will 
be most effective in overcoming resistance will be those that are attentive to social meanings and 
that are expressed in ways consonant with evaluative judgments of the community.  Access to 
and funding for treatment, probably the greatest practical factor relating to whether a person with 
a mental illness wind up in the criminal system, also depends upon altering social meaning.  
States’ preferential funding of mental health services in prisons instead of hospitals represents a 
set of political choices and commitments.  These funding choices respond to the preferences of 
popular constituencies and are no less expressive of dominant social attitudes toward people with 
mental illnesses than specific legal statements by lawmakers.
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Of course, legal signaling and social meaning engage dialectically; reform efforts could 
target legal doctrines and institutions, the language of the law, or social meanings of mental 
illness themselves.  Second-generation law and economics offers some techniques for the 
ambiguation of social meanings and the ways in which legal actors can act as “meaning 
architects.”197  These tools should be employed by reformers who seek to substitute a public 
health response for the current public order response to issues of mental illness.
Until there is a shift in the way that the general culture thinks about mental illness, a 
transition from the moral/punitive conception of such illnesses to a medical/therapeutic model, 
people with mental illnesses will remain shut up in actual prisons and in the prison of treatable, 
but undertreated, disease.  These are the prisons of the mind: People with mental illnesses are 
trapped in our thoughts about them.  To get the mentally ill out of prison, we need to think them 
out first.  To do so, we must first think our way out of conventional discourses that reinforce 
historic understandings of the intersection of mental illness and punishment.
197 Lessig, Regulation of Social Meaning, supra note 10, at 1008.
